Beyond isbaaro: Reclaiming Somalia’s Haunted Roads

Summary

Armed conflict in Somalia has disrupted the lives of Somali people for over two decades. While the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) are gaining territorial control, armed groups are able to exploit the vacuum of authority created by two decades of conflict through their own roadblocks. This summary report, aimed at the international donor community, addresses a significant literature gap. It maps existing roadblocks on the road between Beletweyne and Mogadishu and uncovers key information to understanding the ways in which roadblocks cause harm. It calls for collaborative action to reclaim Somalia’s roads.

Key findings

1. Roadblocks are restricting the ability of people, goods and aid to move safely and freely by road, and are impeding progress towards the long-term stability and reconstruction of Somalia. The current political economy of roadblocks is a complex one with competing and conflicting interests, power struggles, corruption and crime all converging within a challenging and hostile physical environment. The issues Somalia’s political economy presents are damaging and need to be addressed urgently to counter several serious implications for the country’s stability and for the wider state-building process.
2. All three political power networks in Somalia use roadblocks for purposes of territorial control and revenue generation. The State, Al-Shabaab (AS) and clan-militia groups, to varying degrees, place personal or political interests over national interests. This significantly hampers security and development, and if unchecked will adversely affect the progress of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its federated regions towards achieving a stable and accountable national government based on genuine reconciliation.
3. Roadblocks foster a culture of corruption across all three power networks. This includes those under state control where there is evidence to suggest that poor resourcing and lack of capacity exacerbates corruption. Regional and local authorities, for example, are increasingly financially dependent on the revenue roadblocks generate but, with an absence of any fiscal or management systems, a small number of powerful individuals control this revenue.
4. Money is found to be a stronger driver for those operating roadblocks than security. On this one route alone, it is estimated that state-run roadblocks generate an annual revenue of more than $10m and that Al-Shabaab are likely to be taking $3m each year from people passing through roadblocks under their control.
5. Roadblocks contribute to insecurity. Road users are subjected to crimes and human rights abuses which regularly take place at roadblocks, ranging from low-level harassment, through intimidation and threats, to extreme violence including rape and killings. Significantly, majority of these occur at non-state controlled roadblocks. Experience and/or fear of crime and human rights abuses severely restricts freedom of movement in respect of people, trade and humanitarian aid.
6. Some evidence suggests roadblocks are becoming safer under state control. Most recent serious crimes, as recorded from the interviews from this study, are largely attributable to clan-militia run roadblocks.
7. Al-Shabaab roadblocks are well organised and comparatively safe. For those who feel able to pass through AS-controlled territories passing through Al-Shabaab roadblocks is their preferred route because it is efficient, quicker and, once initial screenings have been completed, is relatively safe.
8. Roadblocks are often the site of armed conflicts. The FGS, with the support of its allies, is continuing to gain ground in securing roadblocks. However, there remains a substantial number of roadblocks in the hands of Al-Shabaab and clan-militia groups. They are often the centre of conflict where bloody armed clashes between these competing power networks are fought out.
9. A brokering business of roadblocks has developed with road-users reliant on ‘maqalas’ (brokers) who act as intermediaries between each of the power groups to facilitate safe passage for a price.
10. Roadblocks contribute to a widening social inequality. Many road-users are excluded from travelling through Al-Shabaab or clan-militia roadblocks because of their personal profiles, due to the jobs they do, or because of past trauma. Those who can afford to do so, choose to fly. Consequently, for the most part only the poorest and often the most vulnerable in society undertake long distance travel by road and only then, when necessary.
11. Road infrastructure is almost non-existent and is severely hampering economic development. Roads, as they exist in Somalia, are mostly tracks, littered with potholes even where they were once tarmac. When combined with a hostile terrain and a propensity for natural disasters, (most commonly drought and flooding), as well as additional problems of roadblocks, road journeys become a perilous undertaking.
12. A significant lack of quantitative data relating to road use severely limits the ability of future policy and programme development to improve the situation.
13. Roadblocks have a disproportionately negative effect on society, particularly people’s daily life. Many are excluded from travelling, because of their clan affiliations or because they are a potential target for Al-Shabaab. Everyone, whether they use the road or not, bear the cost of higher prices for goods and services because of the high costs of transportation.
14. Roadblocks in Somaliland have made the successful transition to safe and functioning security control posts. Similarly, FGS efforts under the leadership of President Hassan have liberated many districts in Mogadishu from the violence and corruption of roadblocks, transforming them into more effective control posts with an emphasis on security. In both cases, this was because of a conscious process to stabilise the districts through locally-led law and order initiatives which could be applied elsewhere. Clan leaders were also instrumental in achieving change.
15. Unemployment is one of the main drivers of illegal roadblocks. This is undoubtedly the case with clan-militia, many of whom are desperate young men with families to feed, no skills and no visible opportunities. Al-Shabaab continue to exploit these young men who are more susceptible to radicalisation and recruitment.
16. There is significant public support for the FGS to legitimise roadblocks and to run them efficiently and effectively. The overwhelming majority of respondents were certain in their view that roadblocks should be the responsibility of the state but equally there was recognition that this was not yet the case. There was also doubt around the ability of the state to achieve full and effective control. There is a groundswell of support for the FGS to introduce a new era of safe, affordable and accountable roadblocks as part of the transition to stability.

Keywords

• Political economy; roadblocks governance; conflict infrastructure; state-building; informal taxation; security networks; transport economics; armed non-state actors