ADDRESSING THE GAP

PROMOTING YOUTH INCLUSION IN SOMALI PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

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Authorship

This report was a collaborative effort by Transparency Solutions' team of researchers and practitioners. Authors are Sagal Aziz, Erin Gillette, Katherine Henshaw and Savannah Simons. Key contributors were Amel Saeed, Abdirahman Mustaf Mohamed, Khayre Ali Isak from Hargeisa, Kismayo and Baidoa respectively. Transparency Solutions' expertise lies in research, project management, training and strategy through a locally-led approach.

Summary

Youth in Somalia have great potential to positively contribute to peace and reconciliation and a desire to be involved in processes that will bring stability and prosperity to their country. However, there is currently a gap between rhetoric and practice concerning youth's involvement in peace and reconciliation. Young people in Somalia are looking for ways to meaningfully contribute to society, but feel disappointed and disenfranchised in light of the lack of opportunities available to them. Even when opportunities are available, barriers that prevent or minimise their ability to engage, obstruct youth involvement. In this context, some youth turn to other paths available to them such as joining militias and/or extremist groups like Al-Shabaab.

There is much room for growth in engaging Somali youth. Two involving opportunities for youth in Somalia are sport and social media, both of which have the potential to bridge the gap between rhetoric and practice. By taking a holistic, integrated approach to youth participation in peace and reconciliation, young people would be able to attain their full potential as agents of change. Young people's engagement in peace and reconciliation processes would not only benefit them, but also has the potential to benefit Somali society as a whole.

Summary of Recommendations

- Promote intersectional "youth champions" from across Somali society as agents of change in championing youth participation and inclusion.
- Exploit the reach of social media among Somali youth, using popular online platforms like Wakiil to counter violent extremism and to promote peace, reconciliation and democratic principles.
- Create more opportunities for youth involvement in civil society and invest in job creation schemes and skills development through increased support for youth-focused and Somali-led initiatives.
- Ensure that youth are included in formal and informal peace and reconciliation initiatives and that they are not sidelined by more powerful actors. Create a forum for intergenerational dialogue which would encourage youth and elders to communicate and dispel harmful misconceptions.

• Invest in activities such as sport, which are an effective, popular tool for peace and reconciliation among youth. Donors must not only increase funds for this, but take practical steps to ensure that everyone can participate.

Soo Koobid

Dhaliyarada Soomaaliya waxa ay leeyihiin awood weyn oo ay si togan uga qaybqaadan karaan nabadda iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta. Waxa aana ku jira rabitaan ah in ay ku lug lahaadaan hannaanka xasilinta iyo barwaaqaynta loogu soo jiidayo dalkooda. Si kastaba ha ahaato e' imika waxaa aad u kala fog hadalka afka laga leeyahay iyo hawlaha la qabanayo ee khuseeya kaalinta ay dhalinyaradu ku leeyihiin nabadda iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta.

Da' yarta Soomaaliya waxa ay raadinayaan habkii ay ugu suurtogeli lahayd in ay si macno leh wax ugu soo kordhiyaan bulshada. Laakiin waxaa niyadjab ku ridaya fogeynta lagu hayo iyo sida aan wax fursad ahba loo siinayn. Mararka yar ee ay fursado jiraanna, waxaa horyaalla caqabado u diidaya ama xakamaynaya awooddii u saamixi lahayd in ay hawlaha socda dhinacooda qabtaan. Markii uu xaalku sidaas noqdayna, waxa ay kalliftay in dhalinyarada qaar ay u leexdaan jidadka kale ee u furan, sida in ay ku biiraan maleeshiyooyinka iyo / ama kooxaha xagjirka ah, ee Alshabaab ay ka mid tahay.

Waxaa jira meelo badan oo laga xoojin karo hawlgelinta dhalinyarada Soomaaliya; Waxaa ka mid ah xoojinta ciyaaraha iyo warbaahinta bulshada. Labadan arrimoodba waxa ay is-waafajin karaan hadalka afka laga leeyahay iyo hawsha la qabanayo. In hab dhammaystiran oo is raacsan dhalinyarada looga qaybgeliyo hawlaha nabadda iyo dib-u-heshiisiintu waxa ay keenaysa in da'yartu ay rumeeyaan awoodda buuxda ee ay u leeyihiin in ay wakiillada isbeddelka keenaya ka mid noqdaan.

Dadka da'yarta ah oo laga qaybgeliyo geeddi-socodka nabadaynta iyo dib-u-heshiisiintuna iyaga oo keliya faa'ido uma aha, balse waxaa ay sida oo kale faa'ido u leedahay guud ahaan bulshada Soomaaliyeed.

Talo-soo-jeedin kooban

- In la xoojiyo meelaha ay ka midaysan yihiin haldoorka dhalinyarada Soomaalidu deegaan kasta oo ay ka yihiin Soomaaliya, si ay uga qayb qaataan dedaalka lagu xoojinayo in dhalinyarada laga qaybgeliyo hawlaha nabadda iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta.
- In laga faa'idaysto warbaahinta bulshada oo ay dhalinyarada Soomaalidu aad u isticmaasho, iyada oo farriimaha la marinayo fagaareyaasha internet ka ah, sida Wakiil si loo la dagaallamo xagjirnimada gacan-ka-hadalka ah loona xoojiyo nabadda iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta, iyo mabaadii'da dimuqraadiyadda.
- In la abuuro fursado badan oo dhalinyarada lagaga qaybgelinayo bulshada rayidka ah iyo in la maalgeliyo qorsheyaasha shaqo abuurka iyo horumarinta xirfadaha, si taas loo suurtogeliyana waa in la kordhiyo caawimada lagu taageerayo hindiseyaasha dhalinyarada ku jihaysan ee ay isla Soomaalidu hoggaaminayso.
- In la xaqiiyo in dhalinyarada lagu daro hindiseyaasha rasmiga ah iyo kuwa aan rasmiga ahayn ee nabadda iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta, lana hubiyo in jileyaasha awoodda lihi aanay yaraysan doorka dhalinyarada. Sida oo kale in la abuuro gole ay doodaha isku weydaarsadaan jiilasha kala duwani waxa ay dhalinyarada iyo waayeelkaba ka caawin lahayd in ay xiriir yeeshaan iyo in ay iska saaraan fahannada qaldan ee dhibaatada leh oo ah kuwa keenaya in dhalinyarada laga reebo hawlaha nabadaynta iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta.

• In la maalgeliyo ciyaaraha, sida Isboortiga oo caan ku ah in ay kaalin wax-ku-ool ah ka qaadan karaan nabadaynta iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta dhalinyarada dhexdeeda ah. Deeq-bixiyeyaashu waa in ay kordhiyaan maalgashiga ay ku bixinayaan ciyaaraha, isla markaana ay hubiyaan in tixgelin gaar ah la siiyey sidii qof kastaa uu uga qaybqaadan lahaa.

Introduction


Since 1991, Somalia has experienced ongoing multi-dimensional conflict creating an environment of insecurity and governmental fragility. The rationale for this paper is to bridge the gap between rhetoric and practice concerning the role and agency of youth. This paper seeks to gain an understanding of the reality and complexities of youth involvement in peace and reconciliation. By listening to the voices of Somalia's youth at a granular level, Transparency Solutions aims to shed light on ways to bridge this gap and to employ a holistic, integrated approach to youth involvement in peace and reconciliation.

This report is based on desk research and 43 semi-structured interviews with youth between the ages of 18-30. The interviews were conducted face-to-face, in the Somali language in three locations: Baidoa, Kismayo, and Hargeisa. Respondents were anonymised and the legend is as follows: the 15 interviews conducted in Baidoa and Kismayo are numbered 1-15B and 1-15K respectively and the 13 interviews in Hargeisa are numbered 1-13H.

The sampling method, while not claiming to be representative of all Somali youth, aimed to draw a diverse number of respondents in order to encompass a wide variety of perspectives. The respondents comprised a range of socio-economic groups, professions, education levels and life experience. The employment sectors of the respondents are shown in Figure 1.

Differences in context between south-central Somalia (Baidoa and Kismayo) and Somaliland (Hargeisa) were taken into account by adjusting some of the interview questions. Processes of peace and reconciliation developed differently between the two regions. Somaliland underwent an organic process driven by internal actors via clan-to-clan resolution and national-level proceedings whereas south-central Somalia has been largely shaped by external actors, without the same degree of local ownership. The trajectory of the interviews reflected these differences.

This paper begins by presenting the views of the respondents concerning peace and reconciliation before moving on to an analysis of the existing barriers and motivations of youth engagement. It will next consider the extent to which militias and extremist groups, especially Al-Shabaab, obstruct the inclusivity of youth in peace and reconciliation. Finally, it will conclude with a summation of the themes that have emerged and the resulting policy recommendations.



Perceptions of Peace and Reconciliation

The youth population in Somalia is one of the highest in the world. According to the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), youth in Somalia comprise an estimated 70 per cent of the population.¹ Furthermore, youth have grown up knowing nothing but war and its aftermath, which has shaped their perceptions of peace and reconciliation. To 37 per cent of the respondents, peace was defined as the absence of war and fear, expressing a negative premise for defining peace.² International post-conflict research supports the importance of encouraging cooperation across societal divides, a view echoed by 34 per cent of Somali respondents who emphasised the importance of cross-clan dialogue.³ Respondent 8K described peace and reconciliation as the creation of "a place where all citizens can live in harmony."⁴ In a Somali context, this necessitates addressing longstanding grievances, especially those concerning clan, which is the primary ordering mechanism of society. One example of a lingering resentment to be addressed is the systematic exclusion of minority clans from political power and resources due to the 4.5 power-sharing system in south-central Somalia.⁵ If peace and reconciliation in Somalia are to be effective, the process must be more inclusive.

"Reconciliation is bringing together clans who are still living in hostile environments." Respondent 15K "Peace and Reconciliation means life to me. If there is no peace, there is no life." Respondent 2K

Somali Youth and Peace and Reconciliation

Fifty per cent of respondents fully agreed that youth are actively involved in peacemaking, yet significantly, when asked, only 27 per cent of respondents could provide an example of a young person or an opportunity to be involved in. Rather, a common theme within the interviews was the lack of space for youth involvement and opportunities for young people to provide meaningful contributions to society.

Youth unemployment levels in Somalia and Somaliland are amongst the highest in the world. In 2012, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that the unemployment rate for youth aged 14-29 was around 67 per cent, however, in 2016 the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimated that the rate may now be closer to 80 or 90 per cent.⁶A combination of weak governance, lack of civil society, and poor economic development all contribute to little community engagement and few recreational activities. Furthermore, the prevailing culture, particularly in Al-Shabaab-occupied or recently liberated areas, limits opportunities for safe self-expression. These realities combine to create a void leaving many youth feeling bored, undervalued, and powerless. The absence of opportunities that could provide Somali youth with a sense of purpose and empowerment leaves them vulnerable to less positive life paths.

The Role of Sport


Sport in Somalia is a key example that demonstrates the gap between youth opportunities and involvement. Fifty-six per cent of respondents from Kismayo and Baidoa cited sports tournaments as an effective method for engaging youth in positive activities, which reduce the likelihood of their joining violent groups due to boredom or lack of opportunities. The respondents, however, were unable to provide examples nor did desk research produce compelling evidence of local sports programmes. What can be evidenced, however, is that sport has become firmly embedded into the

rhetoric of youth and peace and reconciliation. One possible reason for this discrepancy is the universality of sport as well as its high visibility in societies.⁷ Second, sport is seen as having "a unique power to attract, mobilise and inspire" thus being a powerful tool through which to engage vouth.⁸ Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that sport has an "almost unmatched role...in promoting understanding, healing wounds, mobilising support for social causes, and breaking down barriers."9

While these examples support sporting activities as an ideal method of youth participation, the discourse frequently overlooks practical problems. In Somalia, for example, sports facilities are few and far between, making access for youth programs difficult. Additionally, facilities that are available are not always conducive to women's participation due to the social and cultural constraints such as the need to have an enclosed exercise area so that men cannot see. In theory, sport is a straightforward and attractive way to facilitate youth involvement. However, this example demonstrates the gap between youth perceptions and the realities of their involvement through sport.

Social Media as an Emerging Platform

Somalia has traditionally been an oral society, however, the news and information landscape is becoming increasingly globalised, interconnected, and internet-based. A 2013 Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) report found that home Internet access is 18.7 per cent countrywide and 26.7 per cent in urban areas.¹⁰ With the increase of Internet access in Somalia, social media usage has grown exponentially and is increasingly a significant platform for Somali youth.¹¹ Our data corroborate the importance and reach of social media; 60 per cent of respondents say they use social media daily, as shown in Figure 2 below.





Al-Shabaab has been especially adept at targeting youth through social media, using it both as a communication platform and recruitment tool. Al-Shabaab has also recognised it is "as much as a threat as a tool" as it has the potential to expose Al-Shabaab members and controlled populations to opposing perspectives.¹² Social media, as demonstrated by Al-Shabaab, is an effective platform through which to engage Somali young people. In 2015, the UN Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security recommended social media as a means to promote youth inclusion.¹³ A positive example of the application of social media in engaging citizen participation in Somalia, is Wakiil, which promotes Somali democracy and accountability.¹⁴ Respondents cited social media as a promising platform for engaging youth.¹⁵ Specifically, they viewed it as a way to facilitate open dialogue as well as a forum for "youth to openly voice their opinions and concerns."¹⁶ Social media enables

youth to be exposed to and learn from other peace and reconciliation processes and be exposed to youth participation worldwide.¹⁷

Barriers to Youth Involvement

While sport and social media are two promising activities, there remains a lack of opportunities for youth in Somalia. This lack of space is further exacerbated by factors that obstruct youth inclusion in the peace and reconciliation process. The interviews highlighted several barriers that included: perceived mindset differences between generations, lack of community and government support; and security concerns.

The majority of respondents believe that the attitude of the older generations is a primary barrier to more youth involvement in the peace and reconciliation process. Respondents expressed the opinion that older generations are unwilling to involve youth for various reasons.¹⁸ One common response was that elders see them as a threat or a destabilising force; for example, "the passion of youth" could inspire aggressive reactions from older generations.¹⁹Amongst elders there is a belief that youth are "unwilling to work within the current status quo" and that they have the potential to disrupt traditional existing structures.²⁰ Here too, there is a gap in the rhetoric if not necessarily the practice, as these "traditional existing structures" were variably defined by respondents as being based on clannism, nepotism, or corruption. Whether intentionally or otherwise, elders are discouraging youth who want to engage in peace processes and who are eager for recognition and approval from older generations.²¹ Voicing support for youth and encouraging receptivity amongst older generations would add significant leverage to bridging the gap between rhetoric and practice concerning youth inclusion.

"Elders always discourage young people by telling them that they do not know what is going on in the process of peace and reconciliation" Respondent 5K

Another significant barrier to youth participation in peace and reconciliation activities is a lack of capacity to support their involvement. One critical way this manifests itself is through inadequate funding and encouragement of youth initiatives.²² A noticeable effect of failing to provide the appropriate support is that it signifies to youth that their inclusion is not a priority. Creating opportunities, however, is not enough. Rather care must be taken that traditionally under-represented groups, such as women or clan minorities, are not overshadowed or silenced, but that all voices are heard and taken seriously. A number of respondents pointed to the lack of positive role models, believing that individuals involved in youth peace and reconciliation activities should be promoted and "rewarded for doing good."²³ Positive encouragement and reinforcement that youth empowerment is a priority, articulated by credible, relatable actors, is an effective and low cost option.

"Lack of financial support for their activities against radicalism and tribalism." Respondent 2K, ex-Al-Shabaab member A third barrier to youth participation is security concerns. The issue of security is the area where respondents displayed the greatest differences between the geographic regions. Seventy-five per cent of respondents in Kismayo and Baidoa cited hostility of environment and fear of being targeted by militias and extremist groups as the primary obstacle to youth involvement. Furthermore, 14 out of 15 respondents in Baidoa stated that fear of injury or death was a risk of becoming involved in peace and reconciliation. While respondents in Kismayo saw violence as a barrier, they did not perceive it as a risk to the same degree as those in Baidoa. This geographic variation can perhaps be explained by greater political unrest and instability in Baidoa.²⁴ Respondents from Hargeisa did not raise security concerns, reflecting the relative stability of Somaliland. As the interviews in Baidoa and Kismayo reflect, there are important security concerns to be considered when encouraging youth participation.

"If I became involved in peace and reconciliation activities I would fear for my life." Respondent 6B

"Youth are deterred from engaging in peace and reconciliation due to fear of being targeted by extremist groups" Respondent 2K, an ex-Al-Shabaab member

These barriers, while hindering youth's involvement in peace and reconciliation, also place them at greater risk of joining violent and/or extremist groups. The interviews revealed several examples of young people who turned to militias and extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab. The following section will examine three key factors that motivate youth to join militias and extremist groups: economic concerns, ideological reasons, and socio-political factors.

Youth Attraction to Militias and Extremist Groups

The primary reason for youth joining militias and extremist groups, cited by 40 per cent of respondents, is the high rate of unemployment in Somalia. A related contributory factor is the high rate of poverty in Somalia, which the UN estimates at around 73 per cent.²⁵ Notably, there were significant geographic correlations between the relative importance of poverty and the "need for money to sustain daily life" as a motivation to join militias and extremist groups.²⁶ Baidoa had the most respondents citing poverty as a primary motivation followed by Kismayo and then Hargeisa, reflecting the overall economic situation of each area. In a 2003 UNDP and World Bank survey, the estimated annual income per capita of the three interviewed regions was: Baidoa US\$100-\$150, Kismayo \$201-250, and Hargeisa \$301-350.²⁷ The effects of these economic realities were made clear by respondents from Baidoa and Kismayo.²⁸ Poverty and lack of employment are seen as powerful drivers in young people joining militias or extremist groups.²⁹

Religious or ideological reasons are another driver for young people to join extremist groups. According to Diab M. al-Badayneh, extremist groups exploit the vulnerabilities of youth, taking advantage of their religious beliefs and devotion.³⁰ Fifty-six per cent of respondents from Kismayo and Baidoa believed that extremists utilise this devotion by manipulating religion to "brainwash and mislead young people toward a specific religious understanding."³¹ Al-Shabaab "entices young people to fight to seek God."³² Youth who become involved in extremist groups are frequently fed the idea that their participation is leading them down the "right path".³³

Youth recruitment to extremist groups is further facilitated by a lack of education and, as one respondent put it, "youth's innocence and ignorance".³⁴ Some choose to leave and pursue other life paths, particularly after experiencing first-hand the harsh reality of being part of an extremist group. Former Al-Shabaab members interviewed cited the realisation that their ideology was a distortion of Islam that included torturing and killing innocent people, as a significant factor in their decision to leave.³⁵ One respondent gave additional details, saying "former extremist members left due to the fear of death and the fear of killing others as well as injustice within the group and the presence of sexual and physical violence."³⁶ Ideological factors therefore not only attract young people to join extremist groups but these same factors, viewed through a different experiential lens also contribute to the decision to leave.

"They promote a wrong idea and they translate the religion as wrong." Respondent 7B

The third significant factor highlighted for joining militias and extremist groups and linked to lack of opportunity elsewhere, is a desire to have status in society. Being part of an organised militia or a known extremist organisation provides a sense of belonging and self-worth. This is especially relevant in the case of Al-Shabaab, which provides opportunities to youth regardless of clan, education, and socio-economic status. This transgression from socially constructed tribal, economic, and socio-political lines is a testament to Al-Shabaab's ability to recruit from all subsections of society which has both earned them the respect, however misguided, of many Somali communities and is part of their appeal. This is especially true of youth who, as discussed earlier, are much more likely to perceive clannism as an outdated concept, held onto by the elders.

Additionally, militias and extremist groups exploit youth's sense of being neglected by their government and society. Such groups are able to tempt young people into joining by the promise of addressing long-held grievances and fears, gaining empowerment and self-worth, providing responsibility, and increasing their socio-political position. These promises are further perpetuated through peer and social pressures where they exist, such as current combatants, or sympathetic family members, imams and clan elders.

There is a direct correlation between the gap created by the rhetoric of youth inclusivity and the lack of opportunity. The barriers to youth participation and the motivation to join militias and extremist groups are interconnected. Increasing opportunities for youth engagement as well as addressing the barriers that hinder their involvement would bridge the gap between rhetoric and practice as well as enable youth to attain their full potential within processes of peace and reconciliation.

Conclusion

Youth in Somalia have great potential to positively contribute to peace and reconciliation matched with a strong desire to be involved in the process of bringing stability and prosperity to their country. What was striking is the power of the rhetoric of youth participation despite compelling evidence that the reality of their involvement is far less than is assumed. There is a mismatch between perception and experience. The implications of the misleading premise of youth participation are of concern since false assumptions lead to false conclusions, which ultimately lead to negative results and poor outcomes. In reality, the vast majority of Somali youth lack the opportunities, space, and support they need to become actively involved in processes of peace and reconciliation, and when they are involved, invariably their voices are marginalised or drowned out by older and more powerful actors. The combination of these factors contributes to a feeling among Somali youth that they are disenfranchised and under-represented, further deepening the void between rhetoric and practice. If this gap is to be addressed, the barriers to youth participation need to be decreased and the drivers for change must be promoted. Interestingly, even though youth in Somalia and Somaliland have had different experiences of peace and reconciliation at a national level, the only significant difference in terms of individual experience is the appeal of militias and extremist groups. Youth throughout Somalia and Somaliland would greatly benefit from the creation of opportunities and their increased ability to contribute to peace and reconciliation in meaningful, visible ways. The involvement of youth through more holistic, inclusive peace and reconciliation processes will further enable them to become agents of positive change in Somalia.

Recommendations

1. Promote "youth champions"

Stakeholders must promote credible and diverse youth champions and older individuals from across Somali society, championing youth inclusion. For the first time in Somalia's history, a quarter (24 per cent) of MPs are aged 40 or under and young activists such as Ilwad Elman are gaining greater prominence.³⁷ There is a unique opportunity for them to be supported as agents of change in achieving greater youth participation and inclusion. This could take the form of a media campaign, making use of TV, radio and online media.

2. Exploit the reach of social media

Social media has a strong, ever-increasing penetration amongst youth in Somalia. Government, civil society and practitioners must utilise it to counter extremist views and promote peace, reconciliation, and democratic principles. This can be achieved through campaigns on popular media outlets from Facebook to Twitter, and/or by replicating successful platforms such as Wakiil.³⁸

3. Create more opportunities for greater youth involvement in civil society

The international community, government and NGOs must increase funding and support of formal peace and reconciliation initiatives which are youth-focused and Somali-led. There is an urgent need to enhance youth skills, invest in job creation schemes, and to increase opportunities for active participation in grassroots and community-based organisations such as youth groups.

4. Ensure all youth voices are heard in peace and reconciliation processes

All formal and informal initiatives in peace and reconciliation must include mechanisms to ensure that youth are not sidelined within these processes or overshadowed by more powerful actors. This should be coordinated by the Federal Government of Somalia and disseminated to ensure a consistent approach. Creating a forum for intergenerational dialogue would help youth and elders to communicate and dispel harmful misconceptions that lead to exclusion.

5. Invest in activities such as sport

Sports work for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. Donors must fund more of the same but additional practical considerations must be made to ensure accessibility to all groups, notably women. The full report contains additional findings to inform ways in which this should be done.

Talo Bixin

1. In la dhiirrigeliyo haldoorka dhalinyarada

Daneeyeyaashu waa in ay dhiirrigeliyaan dhalinyaro haldoor ah oo kala duwan laguna kalsoonaan karo, kuwaas oo laga soo xulay dhammaan qaybaha kala duwan ee bulshadaa iyo sida oo kale dad waaweyn, si loo kordhiyo ka qaybgalka bulshada.

Markii ugu horreysay taariikhda Soomaaliya, ayaa rubuc (Boqolkiiba 24) ka mid ah xildhibaannada la soo doortay ay da'doodu 40 jir tahay ama ka yar tahay, isla markaana dhaqdhaqaaqeyaal da'yar ah, sida Ilwaad Elman, ay magac iyo muhiimad ku dhex yeesheen bulshada. Haddaba waa in laga faa'ideeyaa fursaddaas gaarka ah oo lagu taageero sidii ay u noqon lahaayeen wakiillada isbedelka lagu gaarayo k ujeeddada ah in dhalinyaradu ka mid noqdaan bulshada kaalinta ay leeyihiinna qaataan. Siyaabaha loo dhiirrigelin karaana waxa ay noqon karaan qaabka ah in la sameeyo ol'oleyaal warbaahineed iyada oo la isticmaalayo Talefishannada, Idaacadaha iyo warbaahinta Internet ka.

2. Ka faa'idaysiga warbaahinta bulshada

Isticmaalka warbaahinta bulshadu waxa ay dhalinyarada Soomaaliya ugu dhex faafsantahay si aad u xoog badan oo weliba joogto u sii kordhaysa. Haddaba dowladda, ururrada bulshada iyo xirfadlayaashuba waa in ay ka faa'idaystaan arrintan oo ay warbaahinta bulshada u isticmaalaan ka hortagga aragtiyaha xagjirka ah iyo kobcinta nabadda, dib-u-heshiisiinta iyo mabaadii'da dimuqraadiyadda. Siyaabaha arrintan lagu suurtogelin karaa waa in ol'oleyaal laga dhex sameeyo warbaahinta bulshada ee dadka badani ku xidhan yihiin, sida Facebook iyo Twitter, iyo in la sii xoojiyo masraxyada hore u guulaystay sida Wakiil. TS waxa ay awood iyo waayo-aragnimo u leedahay in ay suurtogelis arrintaas.

3. In la abuuro fursado dheeraada oo keenaya in dhalinyaradu ay bulshada rayidka ah saamayn weyn ku yeelato

Beesha caalamka, dowladda iyo ururrada aan dawliga ahayni waa in ay kordhiyaan maalgelinta iyo taageeridda hindiseyaasha nabadda iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta ee ku jihaysan dhalinyarada, isla Soomaaliduna hoggaaminayso. Waxa baahi degdeg ah loo qabaa in kor loo qaado xirfadaha dhalinyarada, in la maalgeliyo qorshayaasha shaqo-abuurka iyo in la kordhiyo fursadaha ay dadka iskood isu abaabula iyo ururrada bulshada sida kooxaha dhalinyarada ahi u helayaan in ay si firfricoon uga qayb-qaataan hawlaha bulshada.

4. In laxaqiijiyo in codka dhalinyarada la dhegeysto inta lagu gudo jiro geeddi-socodka nabadaynta iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta

Dhammaan hindiseyaasha rasmiga ah iyo kuwa aan rasmiga ahayn ee nabaddaynta iyo dib-uheshiisiinta waa in lagu daraa hababkii lagu hubin lahaa in dhalinyarada aan dhinac laga dhaafin inta geeddi-socodkan lagu gudo jiro ama in aanay dadka awoodda badani qarin daboolin codka dhalinyarada. Waxaa wanaagsan in xukuumadda Federaalka ah ee Soomaaliya ay iyadu gaadato kaalinta isku-duwidda iyo faafinta codka dhalinyarada si loo xaqiijiyo in arrintani ay noqoto mid waarta. In la abuuro gole ay doodaha isku weydaarsadaan jiilashada kala duwani waxa ay dhalinyarada iyo waayeelkaba ka caawin lahayd in ay xidhiidh yeeshaan iyo in ay iska saaraan fahannada galdan ee dhibaatada leh oo ah kuwa keenaya in dhalinyarada laga reebo hawlaha nabadaynta iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta iyo guud ahaan hawlaha bulshada.

5. In la maalgelivo hawlaha av civaaruhu ka mid vihiin

Ciyaaruhu waxa ay kaalin ka qaataan nabadaynta iyo dib-u-heshiisiinta Soomaaliya. Deeqbixiyeyaashu waa in ay aad u maalgeliyaan. Waana in ay tixgelin dheeraad ah siiyaan in si siman loo gaadho dhammaan dhinacyada kala duwan ee dhalinyarada, gaar ahaan dumarka. Warbixinta dhammayska tiran ayaa ay ku jiraan natiijooyin dheeraad ah oo sheegaya hababka arrinta fulinteeda loo mari karo.

Notes

¹ Federal Government of Somalia. 2016. The Somalia National Development Plan (SNDP) – Towards Recovery, Democracy And Prosperity 2017 – 2019. http://mopic.gov.so/wp-

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¹⁵ Interview 6H; Interview 3K; Interview 5K.

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¹⁷ Interview 6K; Interview 15K.

¹⁸ Interview 11K.

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²² Interview 11B; Interview 12B; Interview 13B; Interview 5K.

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²¹ Interview 12H; Interview 4K; Interview 10K.

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