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**International capacity building in the Western Balkans and
the Horn of Africa: Lessons on coherence and coordination**

Deliverable 6.2

(Version 2.1; 24 May 2018)



Global Insecurities Centre



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 653227.

Summary of the Document

Title	DL 6.2 International capacity building in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa: Lessons on coherence and coordination
Last modification	24 May 2018
State	Final
Version	2.1
Leading partner Other participant partners Authors	University of Bristol Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Roskilde University, Transparency Solutions Gilberto Algar-Faria, Ana E. Juncos, Timothy Edmunds, Sonja Stojanović Gajić, Katarina Đokić, Erik Plänitz, Khadir Abdi, Savannah Simons
Audience	Public
Abstract	This report examines the coherence and coordination among international actors (including the EU), and between international and local actors. Drawing on five case study areas (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, Kosovo, and Serbia), this report offers lessons for more effective capacity building.
Keywords	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination • Coherence • Capacity building • Bosnia and Herzegovina • Ethiopia • Horn of Africa • Kosovo • Serbia • EU • UN • NATO • OSCE

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CGPCS	Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DAG	Development Assistance Group (Ethiopia)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU CRIMARIO	European Union Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean
EUCAP Nestor	European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa
EUCAP Somalia	European Union Common Security and Defence Policy Mission Somalia
EUFOR	European Union Force Althea
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force Operation Atalanta
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GTP II	Growth and Transformation Plan II (Ethiopia)
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MoD	Ministry of Defense (Serbia)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SECO	Sectorial Civil Society Organizations
SSR	Security sector reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMiK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Capacity building comprises an array of activities, across multiple policy areas, together addressing wider peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts. This also involves interaction amongst and between international and local organisations and individuals. As a result, capacity building programmes encompass numerous actors, projects, relationships and partners in complex contexts. This in turn implies the requirement for coordination to avoid duplication whilst encouraging complementarity and coherence in the delivery of programmes. However, this also presents a series of challenges.

Coordinating across a complex range of actors and projects is difficult. Few international capacity building programmes take place under the auspices of a single directing authority, able to plan and integrate activities from the top, though in some cases, there may be a lead organisation tasked with a coordination and deconfliction role. Even in the case of a single entity such as an international organisation, state or government department, coordinating multiple capacity building projects, or coordinating between the centre and field, can be challenging. Such challenges often manifest as technical problems – of sequencing, duplication and deconfliction, for example. Still, they are generally underpinned by a more deeply rooted series of obstacles, which will be unpacked in this report.

The challenges identified in this report centre on the capacity of international actors to coordinate in such a way as to promote horizontal, vertical and inter-institutional coherence. For any hope of coherence, however, a lead coordinator must be designated. For instance, in the cases highlighted in this report, it is clear that EU Delegations are worthy candidates when it comes to coordinating EU capacity building programmes on the ground. In terms of vertical coherence, the cases surveyed indicate that efforts on the part of international and local actors respectively must be improved. International actors such as the EU must be proactive and yet flexible in their approach to coordinating the range of actors present in any post-conflict environment. Yet, sometimes internationals are not given an opportunity to coordinate due to late notifications about programmes. On the other hand, for local actors, realities including handling competing political priorities and budgetary and human resource constraints will mean that they will struggle to coordinate between donors. Better communication in both directions is therefore necessary, but building local capacity for coordination must be a priority; in all the cases studied, this did not occur to a sufficient extent. In terms of horizontal and inter-institutional coherence, consistency in approaches is key to sustainable capacity building. To be clear, there is no issue with multiple actors working on the design and/or implementation of any given programme, but without pre-established coordination and a clear mission, such approaches are likely to diverge, having a negative impact on effectiveness.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IN BRIEF

- 1) **Designate a responsible coordinator.** Any coordination effort requires a responsible coordinator to be designated if it is to be effective. The coordinator also stores and provides corporate knowledge. Without a clearly defined coordinator, it is highly unlikely that any international capacity building approaches will be coherent.
- 2) **Establish a ‘rule of law’ team in the EU Delegation to ensure intra-EU coordination.** This creates a single point of contact for all EU components, allowing Brussels-based institutions to devolve more responsibility to Delegations, and enabling Delegations to extend their work regionally while providing policy advice to Brussels, facilitating better learning.
- 3) **Avoid ad hocism in coordination mechanisms.** Ad hocism can lead to last-minute reactive decision-making and conflicting approaches that are more damaging than they are mutually supportive. This can be achieved through the design and implementation, along with awareness raising at all levels, of long-term planning mechanisms, standard operating procedures and decision-making responsibilities.
- 4) **Ensure mandates are flexible.** Flexible mandates allow for the adaptation of priorities and missions on the part of internationals, allowing them to react effectively to rapidly changing situations, and preventing the duplication and/or overlapping of international actors’ programmes. This can be achieved by downsizing missions and decentralising responsibility for achieving objectives (see lesson 7).
- 5) **Specify a long lead-in time for, and promote transparency in, the project formulation process, and begin coordination at the project design stage.** Local interviewees suggested that projects were presented to the donors shortly before those projects were launched. Effective coordination should commence simultaneously with the start of the project planning process to mitigate the risk of duplicating spending, to avoid starting a race among the donors to form local partnerships, and to ensure coherence among donor organisations’ approaches.
- 6) **Engage the smaller, less prominent actors, address local needs and avoid duplication.** Programmes should begin with a comprehensive local needs assessment, but this assessment must take into account not only local needs but also what is already being done by other entities to address those needs.
- 7) **Create a ‘circle of champions’.** Among local partners, individuals may be selected to assist with both the dissemination and assimilation of particular internationally-led initiatives within their networks. This also allows for better situation of coordination within the specificities of the local context.

1. INTRODUCTION

Capacity building is often conceived as a holistic activity. It comprises activities that take place across a range of policy spheres to contribute to wider peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts in target countries. It is also an internationalised practice, with multiple actors and organisations engaged in different projects with a range of local interlocutors and institutions. In consequence, capacity building tends to take place in a complex institutional space, involving multiple actors, projects, relationships and partners. Such complexity implies a need for coordination at the operational level to avoid duplication of effort and encourage complementarity and coherence in delivery. However, it also presents a series of challenges.

The EU has recognised the importance of, and difficulties related to, increasing coordination and coherence in its actions. For example, the EU's Global Strategy puts forward a positive intention for the EU's external action to "become more joined up", highlighting institutional developments implemented so far to achieve this, including the establishment with the Lisbon Treaty of a double-hatted High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS 2016: 49). The EU has also invested a lot of efforts in developing a comprehensive approach among its different components and instruments (European Commission 2013; Faleg et al. 2018).¹ In its Global Strategy, the EU highlights the need to develop an integrated response to conflicts and crises, expanding the comprehensive approach further. Particularly, it advocates:

a multi-dimensional approach through the use of all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution ... a multi-phased approach, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle ... a multi-level approach to conflicts acting at the local, national, regional and global levels ... [and] a multi-lateral approach engaging all those players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution. (EEAS 2016: 28–29, emphasis in the original)

Given the emphasis on coherence and coordination at the political level, this deliverable seeks to provide a better understanding of these issues in the context of the implementation of local capacity building programmes in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. Moreover, as illustrated elsewhere (Juncos et al. 2017), a lack of coherence and coordination might also have an impact on the effectiveness of local capacity building programmes. Uncoordinated capacity building activities tend to be largely ineffective, as they are prone to duplication and contradiction. The lack of coordination lessens these programmes' impact and wastes resources while simultaneously eroding their credibility and local legitimacy. It also exhausts local and international staff alike.

¹ The comprehensive approach is broadly defined as "a process aimed at facilitating system-wide coherence across the security, governance, development and political dimensions of international peace and stability operations" (de Coning and Friis 2011: 245)

This deliverable focuses particularly on coordination and coherence between international actors, but also between international and local actors. The various international actors delivering capacity building include national donor states, international organisations such as the EU and the UN, and civil society organisations such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This is not a unitary group, and coordination challenges within organisations and between Member States abound. While problems related to a lack of coherence have impinged upon the efforts of every international organisation and country involved in capacity building, in the case of large international organisations like the EU, internal coherence represents a specific challenge. Different factors explain why ensuring coherence is such a difficult task: these include foremost the complexity of financial and decision-making procedures and the number and diversity of actors involved in both the decision-making and the implementation process. If capacity building at the international level is complex, so too are the local political environments in which it takes place. This is visible at the policy level, between the different institutions, organisations and actors of government. However, it is also likely to include variegated configurations of political power and interest within the country concerned, as well as distinctions such as those between regions, or between political elites and civil society.

Therefore, this report addresses the following guiding question: How can the EU and other international actors best coordinate their local capacity building initiatives? In order to answer the guiding question, a series of sub-questions can be identified:

- a) How is local capacity building coordinated? Are these programmes coherent?
- b) How do international actors coordinate their capacity building programmes?
- c) How do local and international actors coordinate capacity building programmes?
- d) What are the impediments to the coordination of local capacity building by local and international actors?
- e) What are the common trends between cases where the coordination of local capacity building is, or is perceived to be, failing or failed?
- f) Are there any examples of best practices in the coordination of local capacity building? What can be learned from these examples?

The next section gives an overview of the key concepts that will be applied to the case studies: coherence and coordination. After a brief literature review, which serves to unpack these two concepts in particular and frame the wider context of the issues to be addressed, the report proceeds to analyse in turn each of the case studies: Bosnia and Herzegovina (also referred to in this report as 'BiH' or 'Bosnia'), Ethiopia, Kosovo, Serbia and the Horn of Africa. In each of these case studies the context is introduced before the coherence of approaches to capacity building is analysed. Following this, in each case study coordination mechanisms for capacity building are evaluated. Each case study ends with a summary of lessons identified from the given context. These feed into the report's concluding section, which draws together the findings from the five case studies and distils the lessons and recommendations.

2. COHERENCE IN CAPACITY BUILDING: A LITERATURE REVIEW

Research into local capacity building² has highlighted two key problems affecting the implementation of programmes: (in)effectiveness and (in)coherence. This deliverable focuses on the latter given that, as illustrated by Ana Juncos and colleagues (2017), a lack of coherence and coordination has a significant negative impact on the effectiveness of local capacity building programmes. As mentioned in the introduction, coherence (and its pursuit), has become a key objective at the international level, with the official rhetoric placing particular importance on the need to develop a comprehensive or integrated approach (de Coning and Friis 2011: 244; see also Faleg et al. 2018). Nevertheless, as Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis note, coherence does not receive a commensurate level of commitment during the implementation stages, meaning that “the policy debate has been setting itself ambitious targets for coherence that are impossible to achieve in practice” (2011: 244).

Coherence is defined here as “the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, governance and security dimensions of international peace and stability operations towards common strategic objectives” (de Coning and Friis 2011: 253). This report will consider three forms of coherence at the strategic level in particular:

- **horizontal coherence** between different sectoral policies (e.g. development, humanitarian, security, enlargement, and trade policies, to name a few);
- **vertical coherence** between the policies of an international organisation and those of its Member States (e.g. between EU policies and national policies); and
- **inter-institutional coherence** between the policies of different international actors working in the same area (see Nuttall 2005; see also Juncos 2013).³

This deliverable will employ the above categorisations when analysing each case study. Through these, the report will assess the types of coherence efforts within each context and their respective effectiveness.

Coordination refers to “an activity aimed at sharing information and acting on that information with a view to avoiding conflict, duplication or overlap, so as to ensure a more coherent overall undertaking” (de Coning and Friis 2011: 256). Coordination implies the existence of institutional structures that facilitate communication and linkages between different actors (institutional bridges) at the operational level. While in most cases

² For a discussion of the concept of capacity building, see Juncos et al. (2017).

³ The latter category has been adapted from Simon Nuttall’s (2005) original conception of institutional coherence, which focused on consistency between European Community and intergovernmental bureaucratic structures (see Edwards 2011: 48).

coordination will be something that is externally driven, in some instances coordination has paradoxically been a responsibility that local authorities are charged with undertaking. This is especially the case in the immediate aftermath of large-scale disasters, in which urgent, formal coordination responsibilities are accorded to governments (Eade 2005: 180). While this form of coordination may hold more local legitimacy than international coordination, it is worth noting that any form of “coordination between civil society organisations can be marred by competition over access to funding or due to political rivalry” (Allen 2006: 91; see also Pelling 2002: 70–71). That being stated, this local form of coordination is the exception to, rather than the norm of, capacity building: coordination is generally attempted at the higher level, with more emphasis being given to the ways in which international institutions collectively coordinate.

The need for a coherent and coordinated approach is highlighted in many studies, notably when it comes to peacebuilding and security sector reform (SSR). Two important themes for this report within the coordination strand are the problems of allocating resources and the question of who to report to in an environment characterised by **multi-actor and institutional complexity**. For instance, drawing on the case of East Timor, Richard Caplan highlights “the confusion – and tension – that may exist in such situations between the UN’s dual role as both a mission and an embryonic government”. Others highlight the problem of a lack of coordination, which in turn undermines local capacity building in maritime SSR (cf. Bueger 2014; Edmunds 2014).⁴

Such problems are particularly marked in the case of the EU. A range of studies argue that the EU’s incoherence in crisis response and capacity building owe to the sheer multiplicity of actors and tasks requiring its coordination in any given situation. For instance, concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Meike Lurweg (2011: 119) identifies “several patterns of institutional, horizontal, and vertical incoherencies regarding the EU’s development and security policies in eastern DRC”. These conditions, Lurweg contends, arise from divisions between Commission and Council approaches, between the instruments used by the various European entities, and even from disagreements between individuals (2011: 119). This was observable in the case of the EU’s police reform policies in the DRC, where an absence of formal coordination led to infighting and even impasse between European actors in this area (Justaert 2012: 232). Vertical incoherence has also been illustrated by the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis, which combined with weak inter-institutional coherence, meant that “there were no major breakthroughs in the multilateral division of labour” (Koenig 2011: 16). Similar problems were observed in the case of the Solana process with Serbia and Montenegro (Keane 2004: 505) and the EU’s intervention in Bosnia (Juncos 2013). But coherence is not a permanent or binary phenomenon: Nicole Koenig notes that “the EU has often grown stronger and more coherent through crises” (2011: 16). Moreover, in some instances, the EU

⁴ This argument has been expanded in other EU-CIVCAP publications (see Bueger and Edmunds 2017; Edmunds 2017).

is nonetheless well positioned to occupy a coordinating role given the fact that the EU might be seen as a more impartial actor than its Member States, with a strong international reputation and significant resources, not least in the development and humanitarian areas (Furness 2014: 32).

There is much still to be achieved for the EU in terms of coordination and coherence. Furness highlights a range of limitations to effective coordination and coherence, with respect to the EU, which he breaks down into cognitive, issue-related and system-related factors, noting on the latter point **the primacy of the Member States** (2014: 33–35). This has been identified as an important issue in the case of SSR, which “is haunted by the primacy of national rather than EU-level interests” (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012: 154). Indeed, Arnout Justaert elaborates with reference to the case of the DRC that the implementation of EU SSR activities is often affected by duplication and lack of coordination with Member States’ programmes (2012: 232). Furthermore, it has been difficult for the EU to achieve horizontal coherence between the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and other policies (development, humanitarian assistance and trade), something that is highly relevant within conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Its largest challenge in this regard arguably remains the task of achieving “better coordination and complementarity between the long-term development support provided by EU Delegations and the short-term engagement that characterises CSDP missions” (Madsen and Pietz 2014: 4).

As well as issues relating to the multi-actor nature and complexity of international initiatives, when it comes to coordination and coherence, **local ownership** and **partnership** are consistent themes running through a section of the literature on capacity building. Partnership tends to imply, in the context of development, “humanitarian, moral, political, ideological or spiritual solidarity between nongovernment development organisations in the North and South that [have] joined together to pursue a common cause of social change” (Fowler 2000: 1). Effective capacity building must therefore be coordinated in such a way as to ensure that partnerships are productive, and that approaches are appropriate to the local context. However, this coordination is often lacking, meaning that local applicability and overall coherence both suffer. Anna Jarstad, for example, argues that obstacles to local ownership of SSR include a disconnect between planning and the local context in which it needs to be implemented, with different conceptions and practices regarding the implementation of SSR (2013: 384–385). For their part, Willem Oosterveld and Renaud Galand argue that SSR and justice sector reform need to proceed together “according to a common strategy and a coordinated implementation framework to ensure that local ownership is respected in a substantive way” (2012: 195–196). Meanwhile, Caplan notes that local capacity building more generally is a long-term process, and that there is therefore a requirement for international actors to promote greater local engagement in capacity building programmes (Caplan 2004: 231). In other words, there is a balance to be found somewhere between rigid

international coordination on the one side, and a complete lack of coordination in general on the other, which promotes locally owned and sustainable capacity building.

Related to this is the issue of **sustainability**, defined as “the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed” (OECD 2010: 36). Only where capacity building is well coordinated will that capacity be sustainably improved. Some have critiqued the evident mismatch between the promotion of local capacity building in rhetoric and the efforts and strategies to incorporate local NGOs into post-war or post-conflict recovery processes, for example, in the case of East Timor (Patrick 2001: 49). Moreover, coherence is to be striven for, both between international and local actors, and among local actors themselves. Not only must there be coherence between international agendas and local needs, but those international agendas must also enjoy transparency among, and be accepted by local actors.

In the case studies analysed below, donor coordination and its effectiveness will vary from one context to the next and between different sectors (security, development, etc.). As such, this report’s case studies will together highlight the strengths and weaknesses of various pivotal coordination attempts made by the EU and other international actors across the different case study areas. Each case study will analyse the overall coherence of approaches and the coordination mechanisms put in place, and identify key lessons and best practices from the given context.

3. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: THE CENTRALITY OF EU COORDINATION

Introduction

The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights issues arising in relation to coordination among international and local actors in capacity building of the security sector (namely, police and defence reform). With different organisations and actors (military, police and other civilian agencies) involved in different activities, it is crucial to establish appropriate coordinating arrangements.

If complexity is characteristic of international capacity building efforts, Bosnia is archetypal of a dense network of actors involved in the capacity building field. As an example, one can mention the following international organisations that have undertaken capacity building projects in the region at some point since the mid-1990s: the Council of Europe, DCAF, DFID, the EU, ICITAP, NATO and the OSCE.⁵ To this jungle of acronyms, one can add a vast number of nongovernmental organisations and other bilateral donors (for example, EU Member States). Some of these actors have a multi-sectoral approach (such as the EU); others focus on specific activities (e.g. NATO with its focus on defence reform). What is evident is that very often these activities are motivated by different rationales and have been launched at different stages, thereby complicating overall coordination efforts. As summarised by an interviewee, this is because “they are starting some projects in different phases from one another and they don’t really know what’s going on – what projects are implemented, what they have achieved so far”.⁶

According to one of the interviewees, this is not just a question of “What instrument should we use?”; it is also about sequencing.⁷ Problems caused by the duplication of and overlaps between programmes were also mentioned by several local interviewees working for the Bosnian government or for NGOs implementing capacity building programmes.⁸ As summarised by one interviewee, “sometimes it’s not clear who is supposed to implement a programme. There’s no issue on our side, but often three donors will run a similar programme at the same time and not coordinate between themselves.”⁹

⁵ DCAF refers to the Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces, DFID to the Department for International Development (UK), ICITAP to the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, and OSCE to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

⁶ Interview BH03.

⁷ Interview BE02.

⁸ Interviews BH03, BH06, BH08 and BH11.

⁹ Interview BH11.

In the case of the EU, capacity building efforts in Bosnia are complicated by the fragmentation of the EU's presence on the ground and the fact that different EU actors were deployed at different times. Alongside the Commission's Delegation, the EU established an EU Special Representative in 2002 and an EU Police Mission (EUPM) in 2003;¹⁰ a military operation, EU Force Althea (EUFOR) followed in 2004. Through its different initiatives, capacity building through training, mentoring and financial assistance has become a critical component of the EU's role in BiH.

Coherence of approaches

As far as **horizontal coherence** is concerned, capacity building programmes focused on the security sector still need to achieve better integration with other EU policies like those on development or enlargement. Overall there is still a tension between, on the one hand, the deployment of an executive CSDP operation such as EUFOR, currently focusing on capacity building and the training of the Bosnian Armed Forces and, on the other hand, the country's progress towards EU membership.

In terms of **vertical coherence**, similar issues were acknowledged by the interviewees. According to one interviewee, "you don't see much coherence in terms of policies towards Bosnia among EU Member States' embassies".¹¹ Each Member State might develop its own capacity building initiatives alongside those of the Commission, EU Special Representative or EUFOR, but these are not always coordinated.¹² In other cases, this lack of coordination relates to the lack of communication and information sharing, especially when it comes to intelligence sharing by EU Member States.¹³

Despite the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, coherence between different EU actors remains an issue in capacity building initiatives, especially when it comes to coordination between Council and Commission SSR programmes (Juncos 2013; Kurowska 2009). Civilian CSDP missions have suffered from institutional turf wars as both the European Commission and the Council Secretariat have sought to protect and extend their areas of competence (Klein 2011). In Bosnia's overcrowded context, tensions did not take long to materialise in 2003 between the newcomer EUPM and the European Commission, which had been present in the country for much longer and which regarded the EUPM as an unwelcome intruder in its areas of activity. According to one interviewee, in the case of the EU's activities in Bosnia, problems of institutional (in)coherence were still evident in the relations between

¹⁰ The EUPM was terminated in 2012.

¹¹ Interview BH04.

¹² Referring to the Ukrainian case, for instance, an EU official admitted that "when I was reviewing 'EU' initiatives, including Member State initiatives, there were more than 500 SSR projects in Ukraine only" (Interview BE02).

¹³ Interview BE02.

the EU Special Representative and the EU Delegation despite the double-hatting arrangement. More specifically, he argued that “they don’t know what each other is doing, which programmes they’re working on, because their superiors are different and they’re sending information to their own departments in Brussels”.¹⁴

In line with the EU’s integrated approach (EEAS 2016), coordination between military and civilian instruments is important in the case of the EU’s activities in Bosnia because the EU has deployed simultaneously both types of instruments on the ground.¹⁵ Yet problems of coherence were evident between EUFOR Althea and the EUPM in Bosnia, where both missions experienced coordination problems when dealing with the issue of organised crime (Juncos 2013). One interviewee observed that this had a lot to do with the fact that they had different approaches, but also with the fact that “the military and the police just don’t mix too much, at least not in the policies and the programmes that they implement”. As a result, “there was very little cooperation between EUPM and Althea”.¹⁶

EU initiatives take place in a very ‘crowded’ scenario, making **inter-institutional coherence** with other international actors (international organisations and NGOs) a difficult task (Juncos and Collantes-Celador 2011). As one interviewee put it, “intra-EU coordination is a challenge, but also [that] with other international partners, especially since resources are not unlimited”.¹⁷ However, as acknowledged by the same interviewee this problem is not specific to the EU but affects other international actors such as the US.

Coordination mechanisms

Despite the challenges relating to the complex EU intervention in the country, not all coordination efforts have failed. There are some examples of good coordination and positive working relationships, for instance, between the EUFOR operation and the NATO HQ in Bosnia. In this case, effective coordination has more to do with informal and ad hoc mechanisms of coordination on the ground between the two organisations than it does with formal coordinating arrangements in Brussels. NATO has traditionally been the main actor dealing with defence reform in Bosnia. First, through its military operations in the Western Balkans, NATO played an important role in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in Bosnia and other regional countries. Furthermore, through the Partnership for Peace, NATO has led the reform process of the armed forces of these countries by providing advice on legislation, capabilities and training to bring them closer to NATO standards. Meanwhile, EUFOR, which was deployed in 2004, is responsible for

¹⁴ Interview BH03.

¹⁵ From 2004 to 2012, both the EU’s police mission (EUPM) and its military operation (EUFOR) were operating in Bosnia.

¹⁶ Interview BH05.

¹⁷ Interview BE02.

capacity building. Due to ‘frozen’ relations between the two organisations at the political level, any problems or disagreements regarding the division of labour between the two organisations have usually been solved in an ad hoc manner on the ground. For instance, according to one interviewee, EUFOR and NATO “coordinate very frequently. The US/NATO commander, who is a one-star [OF–6], and the EUFOR Commander, who is a two-star [OF–7], sit together almost on a daily basis.”¹⁸ The interviewee continued, “we can see that they [EUFOR and NATO] very frequently act together and also we see joint action”.¹⁹ Another interviewee highlighted that the representatives of the main international actors in Bosnia (EUFOR, NATO, the OSCE and the UN) “communicate almost on a daily basis in order to avoid any sort of overlapping”.²⁰

In terms of recurrent issues that might explain the problems related to coordination (or exacerbate them), the following were mentioned by interviewees:

- 1) the lack of local ownership of programmes and the lack of local knowledge among internationals;
- 2) deficient formal mechanisms for coordination and information sharing; as well as
- 3) the political and institutional fragmentation in Bosnia.

First, a recurrent theme mentioned by interviewees was the fact that some international capacity building programmes were launched without prior or appropriate knowledge of the local context or without the meaningful engagement of local partners.²¹ This in many cases has resulted in the duplication of activities, as donors have not been aware of similar programmes launched by other organisations or, in the worst case, in the creation and perpetuation of initiatives that are not suited to local needs. As put by an interviewee, “you have to be there, with people. You have to listen to their advice, to their arguments. To try to articulate their positive or negative energy into something positive, you have to be there 24/7 and you cannot expect huge results overnight.”²²

Second, the fact that there are no formal coordinating arrangements between donors and local actors was also mentioned by interviewees.²³ By contrast, formal coordination mechanisms, including clear communication channels, were said to improve the effectiveness

¹⁸ Interview BH02.

¹⁹ Interview BH02. The ‘OF’ codes used by the authors to clarify the military phrases used by the interviewee in this interview are NATO codes for the different grades of military personnel – in this case, two different grades of generals; for a full explanation of what these codes mean, please see NATO (2015).

²⁰ Interview BH02.

²¹ Interviews BH03 and BH16.

²² Interview BH16.

²³ Interviews BH04 and BH08.

of programmes on the ground.²⁴ In some cases, this has not been hugely problematic as some informal or ad hoc coordinating arrangements have been established as mentioned in the EUFOR/NATO example.²⁵ As expressed by one interviewee, “there is a good level of informal coordination, but there should be more formal coordination in order to avoid overlaps and confusion”.²⁶ In other cases, there are coordinating arrangements in place among international actors,²⁷ but not necessarily between international and local actors.

Third, the fragmentation of the political system in Bosnia itself is a key issue for interviewees, and a problem that is compounded by the legacies of war.²⁸ For instance, one interviewee explained,

you need to understand that the justice system in BiH is very fragmented, it is not a hierarchical system ... It is true that in other federal systems (like the US) this is also the case, but BiH is a very young state, divided by a civil war, dealing with many of the legacies of the war, and this is not sustainable.²⁹

In the case of the Bosnian police, it was argued that “on the state level you have something called the ‘Coordination Body’, which is supposed to coordinate this pretty much decentralised structure, ensure coherence, and ensure some kind of cooperation between them. That doesn’t really work.”³⁰

Lessons identified

Despite the abovementioned coordination problems, the interviewees quoted lessons identified (or in some cases learned) and best practices in the coordination of local capacity building. For instance, the establishment of a ‘rule of law’ team in the EU Delegation was mentioned as a key mechanism (and best practice) to ensure intra-EU coordination:

Brussels now recognise[s] that not only can we do a good and effective job here because we have the knowledge and expertise, we could also do a good job regionally, and we’re now reaching out more regionally than we ever did before, providing policy-level advice to Brussels on firearms, asset seizure, trafficking. What we’ve learned here is now being taken on in third countries and pre-accession countries.³¹

²⁴ Interview BH06.

²⁵ Interview BH04.

²⁶ Interview BH04.

²⁷ Interview BH02.

²⁸ Interviews BE01, BH04 and BH12.

²⁹ Interview BE01.

³⁰ Interview BH05.

³¹ Interview BH09.

As well as the informal coordination mechanisms and information-sharing procedures mentioned previously, interviewees emphasised the need for flexibility and the ability to adapt mandates to changing circumstances on the part of the internationals. According to one interviewee, adaptation reduces the possibility of overlaps between different international actors. Whether it was NATO or the OSCE, both organisations have not only gone through a mission downsizing process, but have also changed the focus of their role, becoming more targeted in their actions over time. In other words, “international organisations including the EU also change themselves as they go along”.³²

As discussed earlier, a chief lesson identified is the need to develop programmes that meet local needs and avoid duplication. As one interviewee put it, “there is now an understanding that you have to adapt to local needs”, which “requires us to be in constant communication with local partners. Now we don’t just give local partners what they ask for, but we also make sure what they are asking for aligns with our general objectives and theirs, too.”³³ Several interviewees mentioned that, to achieve this, a best practice is for one to establish and/or run needs assessments prior to the launch of the programmes, consultations with local actors, as well as monitoring and evaluation systems.³⁴ Another best practice to promote better coordination between international and local partners involved the identification of a ‘circle of champions’ among local partners to assist with both the dissemination and assimilation of internationally-led initiatives within their networks.³⁵

In sum, while there has been some progress in terms of coordination with the double-hatting between the EU Delegation and the EU Special Representative, the establishment of a rule of law team and the formation of other formal and informal mechanisms of coordination with international and local actors, some coordination problems nevertheless remain. This is not only due to Bosnia’s (and the EU’s own) political and institutional fragmentation, but also at times to a lack of engagement of local actors in programme design and implementation.

³² Interview BH02.

³³ Interview BH04.

³⁴ Interviews BH03, BH04 and BH014.

³⁵ Interview BH04.

4. SERBIA: COHERENCE AND COORDINATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL ACTORS

Introduction

International support for capacity building in the framework of SSR in Serbia since 2000 has seen a range of intergovernmental actors, governments and international donors supporting the development of various aspects of SSR. The coordination among international actors and between local and international actors deserves particular attention.

The main policy framework through which the EU has engaged with the Western Balkans from 2000 onwards has been the Stabilisation and Association Process, which is based on the assumption that the prospect of EU integration will drive stabilisation, democratic reform and regional cooperation, including cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. Such an assessment is clearly expressed in the Zagreb Declaration (2000) and the Thessaloniki Declaration (2003). Even though the term SSR (including the democratic control of security forces) has not been emphasised in EU programmes as such, it has been indirectly addressed via the promotion of the Copenhagen Criteria³⁶ as a condition for EU accession and support for alignment with the EU's *acquis* (chapters 23 and 24). The EU has engaged in SSR activities both directly (through political dialogue and financial assistance via the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)) and indirectly by funding projects implemented by other international actors³⁷ and Serbian NGOs.

Coherence of approaches

At the strategic level, the EU's approach seems to complement those of other international actors that have had a prominent role in supporting the capacity building of security sector organisations, institutions tasked with oversight of the security sector (parliament and independent regulatory bodies, for example) and civil society. The OSCE Mission's mandate is to provide assistance to the national authorities in the field of democratisation and human rights. This mandate also requires the OSCE Mission to Serbia to coordinate with other international organisations and institutions, including the European Commission (OSCE 2001). DCAF, an intergovernmental foundation that has promoted the concept of SSR, regards good

³⁶ The Copenhagen Criteria are the rules governing whether a state may be eligible to join the EU.

³⁷ The EU has since 2002 supported the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), which works under the mandate given by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Regional Cooperation Council (EUSAC n.d.; Poitevin 2013: 10). The EU has also had joint programmes with the Council of Europe, which do not fall under support for SSR but are relevant for conflict prevention, such as the regional project on "Promoting Human Rights and Minority Protection" (2014–16) (see Promoting Human Rights and Minority Protection in South East Europe n.d.). Furthermore, the EU is one of the major donors supporting DCAF (see, for example, DCAF 2017: 50).

governance and accountability of the security sector to be crucial for promoting peace, stability and human security (DCAF 2015). Norway’s holistic approach to security and its linking of security to the rule of law and democratisation of the security structures (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2004; 2008) corresponds with the Stabilisation and Association Process. Moreover, Norway has been committed to supporting Western Balkan states’ reforms and accelerating their integration into the EU and NATO, “in line with their own ambitions” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). The US has also declared its aim to support Serbia’s European integration by helping to build sustainable democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law, regional cooperation and reconciliation, and participating in multinational operations (US Embassy in Serbia n.d.).

Overall, there is a level of **multilateral or inter-institutional coherence** among the strategic approaches of different international actors facilitating capacity building in Serbia. At the same time, there is a lack of joint guidance to operationalise how cooperation between the EU and other international actors should be implemented in practice: currently it appears to be left to the field offices to plan the division of labour and the ways to reach potential synergies.

Coordination mechanisms

Coordination is implemented on a case-by-case basis³⁸ and carried out differently according to line of work (which ranges from providing support to the defence sector, to policing, to the judiciary, to gender and security, and so on). International actors tend not to use formal mechanisms, such as a memorandum of understanding or a standing group, although one exception to this is the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support in Serbia, managed by the World Bank.

Coordination is generally facilitated through multilateral and bilateral meetings, email communication and networking at seminars and conferences.³⁹ Nonetheless, there are contrasting views among internationals in Belgrade on the effectiveness and sustainability of such coordination. One interviewee insisted that they and other internationals like them “make huge efforts to exchange information about who does what”.⁴⁰ Others note that, in the absence of formal mechanisms, coordination vitally depends on individuals and the willingness of particular field offices (and their staff) to manage communication and coordination among donors working on a given topic.⁴¹ Staff rotation seems to pose an

³⁸ Interview RS01.

³⁹ Interviews RS01, RS02 and RS03.

⁴⁰ Interview RS02.

⁴¹ Interviews RS01, RS03 and RS07.

especial problem in the case of embassies, as institutional knowledge on the local context “seems to be getting lost”.⁴²

In some cases, ‘natural’ coordinators are already present: for instance, NATO’s Military Liaison Office in Belgrade regularly gathers the defence attachés of the Member States and enables them to exchange information on initiatives they have been supporting.⁴³ In other cases, coordination depends on funding availability: thus, coordination among donors who were active in the field of gender and security was praised as an example of good practice, but it “lasted as long as one donor had an interest to do it”.⁴⁴ When gender ceased to be a popular topic among the donor community and funding subsequently dwindled, coordination also ceased, although it should be noted that there remain a select few gender-related initiatives still functioning in Belgrade.

During the 2000s Serbia developed and furthered its local ownership of the coordination of international assistance (SEIO 2011: 5). The organisational unit⁴⁵ accountable for development aid coordination was established in 2000 and responsibility for this unit was reallocated on a few occasions until the unit was finally assigned to the European Integration Office (SEIO 2011: 5), which in 2017 transformed into the Ministry of European Integration. Under this, aid coordination remains focused on IPA funds and the ministry coordinates IPA planning and programming at the national level (Ministry of European Integration n.d.). Planning and programming meetings organised by the ministry are attended by representatives of other international donors to facilitate information sharing.⁴⁶ Moreover, bilateral non-EU donors “do not coordinate” with the EU to a satisfactory level; hence, there is no government body in Serbia that would have a complete overview of international assistance.⁴⁷ Furthermore, an interviewee questioned the effectiveness of the government in its coordination of international assistance because “when the state has insights into sources of assistance, it works against itself” by directing funding towards enhancing those capacities that may not objectively be the most needed ones.⁴⁸

A further attempt to coordinate local actors to work together with the EU in identifying local needs for assistance is visible in the inclusion of civil society in the IPA planning and programming through the Sectorial Civil Society Organizations (SECO) mechanism. SECO is a consultative mechanism that encompasses eight sectoral working groups, including one focusing on the rule of law (SECO n.d.). On paper, SECO should not only increase the

⁴² Interview RS07.

⁴³ Interview RS04.

⁴⁴ Interview RS03.

⁴⁵ Serbian official documents refer it as a ‘unit’, rather than a department, sector or division.

⁴⁶ Interview RS05.

⁴⁷ Interview RS07.

⁴⁸ Interview RS07.

legitimacy and local ownership of the process, but it should also help direct funding more efficiently towards the development of the most needed capacities, given that civil society has gained good insights into particular sectors through its monitoring and watchdog activities. For instance, in 2016 SECO warned against duplicating the capacity building efforts of the forensic service in Serbia. SECO argued that prior analysis was required before any further funding could be assigned to this activity, as the forensic service had already received significant amounts of money and there were other areas in need of financing.⁴⁹ In practice, however, SECO does not receive any feedback after submitting its comments and has not observed any impact on the planning and programming of IPA funds.⁵⁰ This has discouraged participating organisations from further engagement.⁵¹ On the other hand, one non-EU donor relies on the “triangulation of information” with NGOs to verify whether the needs for capacity building efforts expressed by certain institutions are genuine.⁵²

While the Ministry of European Integration is primarily responsible for coordinating IPA assistance relevant for the rule of law (police, judiciary and customs), the Serbian Ministry of Defense (MoD) coordinates international assistance to the defence sector by developing annual international cooperation plans. Bilateral annual plans are harmonised via a process of communication with individual donors. In the case of one donor, this process has been described as delivering a ‘menu’ to the MoD, from which the MoD selects the capacity building activities it is interested in taking forward.⁵³ According to a representative of the international community, there have been no ‘scandalous cases’ so far in which the MoD would have abused such a position to demand the same activities from multiple different donors.⁵⁴ Finally, at the regional level, donor coordination in the Western Balkans is to a certain extent facilitated by the Regional Cooperation Council, which, through the provision of analysis and the organisation of donor conferences, works to improve the efficiency of regional initiatives (RCC 2017).⁵⁵

Lessons identified

Several challenges to coordination in capacity building have been recognised by practitioners in Belgrade. According to a representative of the international community, a major impediment is the fact that neither Serbia nor even some donors have a consistent or sufficiently tailored and targeted strategic approach.⁵⁶ Consequentially, the management of

⁴⁹ Interview RS05.

⁵⁰ Interview RS05.

⁵¹ Interview RS05.

⁵² Interview RS01.

⁵³ Interview RS04.

⁵⁴ Interview RS04.

⁵⁵ See also Interview RS02.

⁵⁶ Interview RS03.

capacity building and coordination with other actors is left to individuals, each of whom in turn will have a different understanding of the local context and a different attitude towards capacity building.⁵⁷ Moreover, sometimes coordination with other donors (**inter-institutional coherence**) is simpler than coordination within one's own organisation (**horizontal coherence**), for instance in the case of international organisations that have different programmes targeting the same local actors.⁵⁸ Despite this, overlapping is not recognised as a major issue by representatives of international donors in Serbia, who instead tend to put this down to the fact that different donors still have different areas of focus.⁵⁹ On the other hand, one interviewee observed that donors have in recent years grown more aware of the necessity of coordinating their activities than was the case in the previous decade, when the same actors were only concerned with attaining visible results, even at the cost of duplicating efforts.⁶⁰

Further steps are still needed to improve coordination. First, a major lesson identified from fieldwork results so far is that any coordination effort requires a responsible coordinator to be designated if it is to be effective. The abovementioned example of the 'gender community' demonstrated that good coordination quickly began to wane once the coordinating donor no longer had a vested interest in pursuing it. This was somewhat overcome in the case of BiH through the creation of a more sustainable 'circle of champions', and as will also be demonstrated in the case study of Kosovo below, through the adoption of a 'one lead nation' approach.

Second, local ownership of coordination is possible and desirable, but it requires the capacity of local institutions to be built up in the first place. Unlike the cases above, in each of which to varying extents state building and capacity building are simultaneously taking place, institutions in Serbia were already established when capacity building programmes commenced there. Yet, according to a representative of a bilateral donor that supported capacity building programmes for IPA units in two ministries, an important lesson identified from the previous period was that donors should avoid creating 'islands of excellence' (either as entire new institutions or within the existing ones), as doing this means that the developed capacities will disappear again and die out once the funding has ceased.⁶¹ Finally, and vitally, it has been identified that effective coordination between local and international actors requires the engagement of all relevant local stakeholders, as was demonstrated in the case of BiH above, and will be elaborated later in the Ethiopia case. This is not to say that inclusivity in coordination incorporating local and international actors is easy: arguably, striving for this can make coordination more difficult, but it also makes capacity building more sustainable.

⁵⁷ Interviews RS01 and RS03.

⁵⁸ Interview RS03.

⁵⁹ Interviews RS03 and RS04.

⁶⁰ Interview RS01.

⁶¹ Interview RS06.

5. KOSOVO: COHERENCE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Introduction

The case of capacity building in SSR in Kosovo demonstrates that the effectiveness of capacity building interventions greatly depends on efforts to ensure coherence and coordination between different international initiatives. This section will elaborate on these efforts among international actors in the case of Kosovo, first evaluating the support mechanisms developed, then considering some of the challenges to coordination and coherence, before finally identifying lessons evidenced by this case.

Capacity building by different international organisations was better coordinated in the initial stages after the 1998 conflict thanks to the pillar structure of the UN mission that integrated other major players (the OSCE, the EU and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)). This did not necessarily lead to coherence, however, as much of work was implemented by individual Member States. This phase has also been criticised for limited attempts to develop local ownership. After the unilateral proclamation of independence of Kosovo, the approach to capacity building in the security sector has varied between recognisers and status-neutral capacity builders. This has resulted in the development of different types of capabilities by different actors.

For instance, due to the status-neutral position held by both the OSCE and the EU, they have been working with all elements of Kosovo's justice and security sector except for the Kosovo Security Force,⁶² which is regarded by Serbia and local Serbs as a potential forbear of Kosovo's future military. Only those in the international community who recognise Kosovo are willing to support efforts to build the capacity of institutional actors linked to national security. This is true both for institutions with a formal mandate to deal with the risks to national security (such as the Kosovo Intelligence Agency) and for the light defence force (the Kosovo Security Force, which is perceived as the symbolic guarantor of statehood backed by potential armed force). Thus, the US, the UK and Norway, along with NATO, have been major supporters of the transformation of the Kosovo Security Force. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is still engaged in capacity building, but due to resistance from Kosovo Albanians, it has difficulties in working with the Pristina authorities. Supporting the capacity building of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary seems to be more acceptable among both recognisers and non-recognisers of Kosovo's independence, as it is justified as promoting human security, which is status-neutral.

⁶² Interview KS07.

Coherence of approaches

A significant reason behind the limited effectiveness of capacity building in Kosovo has been the lack of coherence among EU institutions, actors and tools. The key coordination challenge has been experienced between the EU Office and EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), as they are both active in supporting the rule of law – EULEX through its executive and monitoring, mentoring and advising functions since 2010, and the EU Office from as early as 2000 onwards through IPA funding. Politically, there is a perception that the EU has not adequately made use of enlargement-related conditionality and political dialogue to strengthen efforts to build capacity in the rule of law, undermining its **horizontal coherence**. Most interviewees also pointed to the lack of a joint capacity building concept among EU actors present in the field (the EU Office and EULEX).

Second, the **vertical coherence** of EU assistance is undermined by the absence of a consensus between recognisers and non-recognisers of the proclamation of independence of Kosovo and on the types of mandates that should be held by Kosovo's institutions (see above). Some Member States recognised the unilateral proclamation of independence by Kosovo in 2008 (*recognisers*) and five did not (*non-recognisers*).⁶³ The consequence of the absence of consensus among recognisers and non-recognisers was a lack of clarity on the mandates that should be held by Kosovo institutions whose capacity building was supported. A report by the European Court of Auditors also found that “the absence of a common EU position over the recognition of Kosovo has jeopardised the incentive of EU accession” (ECA 2012: 35). Additionally, there is a perception that EU Member States also had their own agendas: as an EU Office member said, “we cannot ask what Germany and Austria are doing. We have to assume that they are doing well.”⁶⁴

The third reason for the poor level of coherence within EU-supported capacity building interventions is the inadequate planning of the EULEX mission. It has been argued that the “objectives and roles of the Commission and EULEX capacity building activities were not adequately assessed and benchmarked” during the planning phase (ECA 2012: 35).⁶⁵ Another weakness in the planning process for capacity building in Kosovo is that the planning document did not contain any elements of an exit strategy – for example, objective benchmarks of progress or a plan for handing over responsibility for capacity building to the EU Office or other international organisations with relevant expertise (ECA 2012: 29).

There has been some progress in the coordination of the EU's input regarding rule of law reforms, as recently the EU Special Representative's team coordinated the unified input into Kosovo's draft legislation of expert comments made by the EU Office and EULEX as a part of

⁶³ These include Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

⁶⁴ Interview KS12.

⁶⁵ See also Interview KS07.

the legislative review mechanism, which checks whether any proposed acts are in line with the EU's *acquis*.⁶⁶ Due to improved coordination in this regard and cooperation with other key donors, including the US, they also managed recently to halt the adoption of amendments to the Law on the Execution of Penal Sanctions, which would have cut prison sentences by a third (Morina 2017). There seem to be more challenges when it comes to coordinating the planning of IPA projects. An audit by the European Court of Auditors found that two IPA projects backed by the EU Office supported the development of a separate border and boundary police intelligence system that was “in contradiction with EULEX’s objective of creating a single intelligence system within the Kosovo Police due to insufficient coordination during the design of this project” (ECA 2012: 26). Furthermore, the EULEX staff⁶⁷ interviewed expressed their dissatisfaction over the lack of coherence in the programming of pre-accession assistance (IPA funds) towards large-scale structural reforms. They criticised the EU Office for employing external consultants for short-term assessments usually lasting only a few days while not taking into account assessments from EULEX’s own in-house experts, which in turn are more comprehensive. Bearing in mind the significant size of resources invested through the IPA and the potential of its use as an incentive for reforms, coordination among key EU players should be enhanced urgently.

Coordination mechanisms

Following Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence, many formal and informal mechanisms of coordination that had been developed during the time of the UN integrated mission remained, but lost their importance.⁶⁸ Due to UNMIK’s loss of political power, the interagency coordination mechanisms under its umbrella, such as the weekly meetings it hosted (attracting the participation of the Council of Europe, the EU Office, EULEX, KFOR and the OSCE), lost their standing among internationals. This has been evident by the fact that today only the OSCE and UNMIK are represented by ambassadors at these meetings, while other intergovernmental organisations send lower level staff.⁶⁹ While the ambassadors of the abovementioned agencies do meet one another for lunch once a week, this informal coordination at the political level has not clearly trickled down the organisational structure.⁷⁰

Since Kosovo’s proclamation of independence in 2008, new coordination fora have developed in relation to the capacity building of specific institutions or sectors gathering major donors

⁶⁶ Interviews KS11 and KS12.

⁶⁷ Interview KS11.

⁶⁸ For a detailed overview of formal and informal mechanisms of coordination between the EU and other international actors, see Dijkstra et al. (2017: 18–23).

⁶⁹ Interview KS02.

⁷⁰ Interviews KS07 and KS13.

for that field. This is exemplified by the monthly meetings of major donors working with the Kosovo Police (the EU, EULEX, ICITAP and UNMiK) or quarterly coordination of major actors in the rule of law area (the EU Office, EULEX, GIZ, the Netherlands Embassy, the OSCE, UNDP, UNMiK, the US Embassy and US Agency for International Development (USAID)). Interviewees indicated that the information exchanged is used mostly for the coordination and scheduling of capacity building activities,⁷¹ and less so for the development of coherent approaches between institutions. Most of the coordination is agreed on an ad hoc basis. With few formal agreements, there are no clear procedures, and coordination depends instead on individual initiative. The perception among locals is that internationals are coordinating on “political matters and not in regard to technical project funding”.⁷²

Despite the limitations highlighted above, within these approaches, good practice has also been identified, particularly in joint initiatives between donors to co-fund particular projects, or where a donor agrees to, or takes over responsibility for, funding follow-up projects started by other international actors when those projects run out of money. As Hylke Dijkstra and colleagues explain in EU-CIVCAP Deliverable 4.2,

it is not unusual that, for instance, one international organisation brings over an expert to deliver training, but has no money for a follow-up study visit, which is then financed by someone else. The EU occasionally relies on implementing partners, foremost UN agencies and the Council of Europe for the projects it funds in Kosovo. There are no clear guidelines for selecting an implementation partner, but it depends on the field of work and capacities of an international actor. (Dijkstra et al, 2017: 23)

The most prominent positive example of successful coordination has been evidenced in the capacity building of the Kosovo Public Safety Academy, which has established a board specifically for the purpose of implementing EU assistance. This assistance effort has also involved key OSCE and ICITAP personnel involved in previous phases of institution building.

The EU’s perspective on capacity building, meanwhile, has become increasingly important due to its intrinsic link with the EU’s integration agenda, and its ability to gain support for this agenda, given the significant size of the assistance package it has provided to Kosovo. As the EU’s integration agenda has become more prominent, closer coordination among EU Member States has developed. The EU Office also holds monthly meetings gathering the heads of missions of the Member States as well as the head of EULEX. As part of the EU accession agenda, the host government is also supported to develop its own capacity to coordinate international assistance. The Ministry of European Integration has a department that coordinates development assistance in various sectors, including assistance provided by bilateral donors and international organisations (meeting twice per year). In addition, each

⁷¹ Interview KS03.

⁷² Interview KS01.

ministry has an internal unit for aid coordination that hosts monthly meetings. Still, major challenges remain in the coordination of the rule of law sector “because there are too many donors in contrast to some sectors that have few donors such as agriculture”.⁷³

Local authorities have been passive observers of competition between donors, as evident in the case of the Law on the Court Structure: it is said that 49 drafts of this law were exchanged between the US and the UN (and later the EU) before it was adopted.⁷⁴ Only recently has the EU Office begun signing memoranda of understanding with the US before engaging in developing substantive legislation to formally divide the roles and responsibilities between the EU and the US, as in the case of drafting the Civil Code.⁷⁵ Local interviewees claim that most of the assistance is donor-driven as “we [the Kosovo government] do not have much negotiation power to refuse assistance or planning capacity to identify clear priorities”.⁷⁶ It is only lately that local actors have become “more proactive by requesting more than accepting”.⁷⁷ There are nonetheless some politically sensitive aspects of capacity building on which locals are not even consulted. Such is the case with implementing the Brussels Dialogue, for which the Kosovo government is “just asked to provide the legal form so that assistance [can] be channelled, but we do not have a say [as] regards the contents of capacity building”.⁷⁸

Lessons identified

One of the key lessons of capacity building efforts in Kosovo is that a lack of joint political vision within the international community diminishes the coherence, and thus the effectiveness, of its approach to security sector reform. It also results in the failure of capacity building initiatives in politically sensitive areas such as prosecuting war criminals and organised criminals, and different perceptions of the legitimacy of international actors among local Albanian and Serbian communities.

Capacity building was more coherent within military institutions (Kosovo Security Force), as all capacity building was completed in line with coherent NATO standards. It was also coherent within the institutions that had been fortunate enough to be developed by a single donor since the deployment of UNMiK to the present day, such as the Kosovo Customs Authority, which was developed and mentored by the UK throughout this period.⁷⁹ Hence,

⁷³ Interview KS03.

⁷⁴ Interview KS04.

⁷⁵ Interviews KS05 and KS06.

⁷⁶ Interview KS03.

⁷⁷ Interview KS03.

⁷⁸ Interview KS03.

⁷⁹ Interviews KS05, KS08 and KS09.

the most effective capacity building was evident in the development of the customs service, due in part to the consistency and coherence of international assistance, which was led and coordinated by only one actor – the UK – for almost two decades, including key personnel in UNMiK and EULEX. Most interlocutors interviewed for this study agreed that the Kosovo Police had more capacity due to the longer-term investment committed to the police service by the international community.⁸⁰ This has included building from scratch – and later strengthening – the capacities of law enforcement and other public safety institutions to deliver security. In terms of capacity building assistance provided to individual security institutions, the Kosovo Police as the oldest of these institutions has received the most attention overall, while the justice sector has become the foremost receiver of assistance and capacity building since Kosovo’s proclamation of independence.

That notwithstanding, Kosovo’s judicial system is still an unhappy amalgamation of i) international judges (initially UNMiK and later EULEX), ii) judges recruited from the ranks of the former Yugoslav judiciary, and iii) newly-enrolled judges (Welski 2014). Moreover, competing models have been promoted by different actors, providing evidence of US–EU competition in support of the justice sector (ECA 2012: 30). Thus, the core legislation has been developed in line with Continental European and/or Anglo-Saxon case law, depending on which international actor had more power at a given moment (ECA 2012: 30).

Incoherent and uneven capacity development of key rule of law and security sector institutions makes interagency cooperation even more difficult due to incompatibilities between different institutional designs and concepts for service provision (for example, the justice and courts service, which is a French-dominated system, may clash with the customs service, which was developed by the UK, while the police service has received contributions from the US and multiple European states). The effectiveness of capacity building is therefore closely linked to the consistency of approaches and coordination mechanisms developed between different actors involved in capacity building.

⁸⁰ Interview KS10.

6. HORN OF AFRICA: COOPERATION IN STRENGTHENING MARITIME SECURITY

Introduction

Capacity building for maritime security in the Horn of Africa region has become an increasingly important international practise in recent years. The rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia from the mid-2000s presented a significant challenge to international shipping and global trade, and it led to a series of responses from international actors. Initially, these were primarily naval in nature, such as the EU's EUNAVFOR⁸¹ Atalanta mission. Over time, however, international priorities have shifted away from naval patrolling towards longer-term efforts to build maritime security capacity in the countries of the Western Indian Ocean littoral, and particularly Somalia. At the same time, since the decline of piracy in the region in 2012, the maritime capacity building agenda has broadened to include a wider range of security issues, including fisheries crimes, the trafficking of people, drugs and weapons, and environmental resource protection. Such activities aspire to address the 'root causes' of these challenges in the regions where they occur, and to support local security actors in doing so. They also offer a cost-effective alternative to direct security interventions by donor states themselves, and an exit strategy for existing deployments.

Building maritime security capacity in the region presents a picture of significant institutional complexity, with multiple donors engaged in a wide variety of programmes, some of which complement, some which duplicate and some of which are in tension with each other. Thus, for example, the EU has three major capacity building missions active in the region. EUCAP Somalia (formerly and until March 2017 known as EUCAP Nestor)⁸² focuses on strengthening the security capacity of Somalia in particular, in order for its authorities to better fight piracy, as well as to support them in effectively managing and protecting their territorial waters and maritime resources. MASE, the EU's Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security in the Eastern and Southern Indian Ocean Region, aims to support police, court and prison staff in littoral states in the arrest and prosecution of pirates, as well as other maritime crimes. EU CRIMARIO⁸³ aims to strengthen regional security and safety in the Western Indian Ocean region by enhancing maritime situational-awareness capacities. Individual EU Member States, such as the UK and Denmark, also have their own nationally sponsored maritime capacity building programmes. In addition, there is a range of other international and national donors active in this area, including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the International Maritime Organisation, national donors such as the US, Turkey, China and the United Arab Emirates, and private contractors like Aktis and Axiom International or Adam Smith International.

⁸¹ EUNAVFOR refers to the EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta.

⁸² EUCAP Somalia refers to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy Mission Somalia, and EUCAP Nestor to the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa.

⁸³ EU CRIMARIO refers to the EU Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean.

Coherence of approaches

The complexity of the donor space in maritime security has led to challenges of coordination and coherence in the region. Capacity building initiatives have often taken place as discreet, technically separate activities, rather than as part of a strategically coherent, coordinated endeavour. This in turn has led to problems of duplication, redundancy and occasional irrelevance of programmes. It also risks fatigue and saturation on the part of local recipients. In interviews, for example, an official in the Somaliland Ministry of Interior noted in 2016 that the ‘key challenge’ faced in implementing programmes was overlap between them and lack of coordination between donors (or **inter-institutional incoherence**). Similarly, an official in the Somaliland Coast Guard observed that there was no proper coordination between donors, and significant overlap between programmes.

Such challenges have resulted from differing strategic or funding priorities on the part of donors, or from different national cultures, traditions and ways of doing things, for example approaches to policing or the court system. There has often been a lack of strategic coherence among donors about what maritime capacity building is attempting to achieve, and how it is to go about doing so. At a minimum, each donor has its own goals and mission parameters, and each is responsible for its own mandate or contract rather than for the entire project of international capacity building.

Tensions have also emerged from a lack of transparency between donors and the sheer number of different projects and programmes that may be underway at any given time, resulting in problems of inter-institutional coherence. This can mean that funding is allocated for very similar activities at the planning stage, leading to duplication or even competition at the delivery level. Thus, for example, the UK DFID-funded contractor Axiom International and EUCAP Nestor both received funding for projects aimed at training the Somaliland Coast Guard in how to use their newly built HQ in Hargeisa. As one local actor noted, “some actors do not want to share their training plans with other actors. This is a problem, because you want to avoid overlap, but it happens all the time simply because the actors who are working with us do not want to work together”⁸⁴ and there is a “lack of clarity, lack of communication between actors involved”.⁸⁵ One interviewee noted a challenge in the

lack of communications between actors involved. For example, one organisation may give one direction and the other one exactly the opposite. These conflicting directions can result in confusion with different countries and organisations providing different training to [the] same group.⁸⁶

At other times, the short- or fixed-term nature of many capacity building initiatives has meant that relationships and knowledge built up over the course of a specific project has been lost

⁸⁴ Interview HA01.

⁸⁵ Interview HA03.

⁸⁶ Interview HA04.

once that project comes to an end. There has been a particular problem in relation to staff turnover in this regard, with international capacity builders often appointed on one- or two-year contracts (or sometimes for even shorter periods of time) with insufficiently effective mechanisms in place for ensuring continuity of effort and memory by their successors at the point of handover.

Coordination mechanisms

Challenges of coordination are enduring and are not easily managed away. They are a consequence of the institutional complexity of the maritime security space, the sheer number of different donors engaged in it, and deeply rooted capacity gaps in recipient countries. In that sense, they are, to some extent, inevitable. However, and despite these problems, the region does also offer some important success stories and examples of best practices for coordination in capacity building more generally. This is particularly so with regard to the fight against piracy, where the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) stands out.

The CGPCS brings together representatives from a wide range of states and implementing agencies, including navies and capacity builders from 80 states and 25 international organisations, to discuss how best to coordinate anti-piracy activities. The membership of the CGPCS is informal and flexible in nature, while its decisions are non-binding. These principles have helped to diffuse political tensions and enabled a division of labour into a few key areas, with responsibility for each assigned to a different independent working group. The CGPCS has had a number of important successes, including the development of a legal system on the basis of memoranda of understanding by which piracy suspects can be arrested, transferred, prosecuted and jailed across different jurisdictions (Bueger and Edmunds 2017: 13, 2018: 21). The CGPCS is distinguished by its informal and practice-based nature, and its emphasis on information and developing shared problem understandings, rather than by top-down attempts to sequence and plan activities through a centralised mechanism.

The EU-led Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa has coordinated activities by sharing information between maritime actors, including within the industry. It also installed an online information network that allowed for real-time coordination between actors through chat functionality. Similarly, Oceans Beyond Piracy has acted as a clearinghouse for information on maritime capacity building and other anti-piracy initiatives in the region. These initiatives have had some successes but have also been hampered by a lack of user engagement and a reluctance to share information that could be politically or commercially sensitive. The Maritime Security Coordination Committee is a forum for information sharing, optimisation and coordination of programmes to build maritime security capacity. Although it is formally supposed to bring together all Somali authorities as well as international donors, Somaliland authorities have been reluctant to take part due to its whole Somalia remit (Edmunds 2017: 10).

Lessons identified

Despite the best practice examples mentioned in the previous section, coordination of capacity building initiatives in the region has faced many difficulties. Overall, we can identify a number of lessons here. First, many of these problems have often been a consequence of a basic lack of capacity or political priority on the part of the local actors themselves, who can struggle to coordinate between donors in an environment of financial and human resource constraint. These problems have been particularly visible in Somalia, where many institutions of maritime security have had to be established from scratch, and the institutional capacity of the state is itself weak. At the same time, they have also been a legacy of a more general regional “seablindness” (see Bueger and Edmunds 2017), that is, a traditional neglect of the maritime arena in states where security priorities have traditionally been focused on the land, such as Kenya, or where, until recently, the maritime security environment had been relatively settled, as was the case with the Seychelles. Even so, the key to successful coordination is likely to be the active engagement of local stakeholders in identifying local needs, and sequencing and prioritising international responses to these through their capacity building activities. Existing local capacity gaps can make this difficult, as discussed above. But to date, international actors have devoted insufficient effort to empowering recipients at the needs assessment and planning stages of project design. As one Somali interviewee noted:

There is lack of coordination: you might see a UN agency and EU funded project which have the same objective. It is because they did not look into our priorities or look into what we have or have not. It is also problematic when these entities are not flexible enough to change.⁸⁷

Most of the interviewees displayed a sense of powerlessness but also a belief that they could change project outcomes if given the opportunity.

⁸⁷ Interview HA02.

7. ETHIOPIA: THE IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING MARGINALISED ACTORS

Introduction

Because Ethiopia has experienced more than two decades of massive aid inflow from Western donors released after the disintegration of the de facto Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police and Territorial Army (Derg) regime in 1991, the various donors involved have faced significant challenges in coordinating such significant contributions. Financial aid by 2011 totalled \$26 billion, which was received collectively from USAID, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the EU, DFID, GIZ, Sida, Japan, Italy and the Netherlands among others (Feyissa 2011). Yet, **vertical coherence** has remained a challenge: despite the fact that the net amount of official development assistance to Ethiopia amounted to \$3.5 billion in 2014 (OECD 2016: 8), and that a poverty reduction rate of 33 percent had been achieved in the last decade (World Bank 2015), the World Bank states that 37 million Ethiopians (50 percent of the total population of 74 million) were still poor or on the brink of poverty in 2015 (World Bank 2015). As such, a significant challenge remains in coordinating capacity building efforts in such a way as to benefit the target population. This role is to an extent fulfilled by the Ethiopian government.

Building local capacities is a priority of the Ethiopian government to take steps towards the eradication of poverty. It is a crucial part of Ethiopia's development strategies and this is reflected in the Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II). The emphasis of GTP II is to create "an implementation capacity that ensures a political economy that is conducive for long-term development and transformation, productive investments and deepening of sustainable governance and democratizations systems" (National Planning Commission 2016: 47). The foundations of a local Ethiopian capacity building approach were laid with the implementation of the National Capacity Building Strategy in 1998 under the supervision of the respective sector ministries. The dedicated Ethiopian Ministry of Capacity Building took over the leadership of the programmes in 2002. However, following a national evaluation that concluded that the initiatives had developed to a sufficiently advanced level, this ministry was dissolved in 2010 and its existing responsibilities were transferred back to the sector directorates (Ministry of Civil Service 2013).

Coherence of approaches

Inter-institutional coherence of donor activities begins with the physical coordination of stakeholders involved in a certain project. Yet smaller international actors in Addis Ababa lack the institutional or organisational capacity required to host meetings due to their limited office space. For this reason, the EU Delegation to Ethiopia has transformed into a hub for EU

Member States' coordination efforts in Addis Ababa. Apart from practical and organisational issues, as mentioned above one of the most pressing challenges remains the fact that donors often inform their partners when a given project is programmed and ready to start, and not at the time of policy formulation beforehand. Therefore, the case of Ethiopia points to the lesson that effective coordination should commence simultaneously with the start of the project planning process to mitigate the risk of duplicating spending and to avoid starting a race among the donors to form local partnerships. Interviewees identified the need to synchronise the beginning of the coordination effort with the start of the project planning process as the single most pressing challenge to ensuring proper coherence of donor activities.⁸⁸

Coordination mechanisms

Efforts at improving **inter-institutional coordination** and harmonisation between the Ethiopian administration and the various bilateral contributions provided under the GTP II (DAG n.d. a) were taken over by the Development Assistance Group (DAG) in 2005. Since then DAG has been aligning international and local positions in a policy dialogue between the Ethiopian government and donors (Feyissa 2011). Originally founded in 2001 as a forum for international actors, DAG now consists of 30 members (DAG n.d. a) and has been equipped with a pooled fund that supports Ethiopia's National Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development in the following areas:

- enhancing the capacities of government and donors alike to achieve aid effectiveness;
- facilitating dialogue between DAG and the Ethiopian government; and
- ensuring support is given to a consultative process on the GTP and the Millennium Development Goals.

Ethiopia–DAG dialogue is formalised in the annual meeting of the High-Level Forum. Meetings of the agency heads of DAG member organisations occur monthly. Prior to those meetings, the Executive Committee gathers to discuss relevant issues. Furthermore, four different technical working groups established under the umbrella of DAG are engaged in the thematic areas of i) the GTP, ii) governance; iii) gender equality, and iv) private sector development. Daily operations are run by the DAG secretariat, hosted by the UNDP (DAG n.d. a).⁸⁹

Particularly relevant here, given their role in the country, are the coordination mechanisms introduced by the UN and EU. In the first case, the UNDP regards itself as a platform for

⁸⁸ Interviews ET02 and ET06.

⁸⁹ For detailed information on DAG architecture see DAG (n.d. b).

mediation between donors and specific partners with different approaches, acting “as a broker that offers technical and financial means to the partner organisation”.⁹⁰ The UNDP considers this proclaimed neutrality and objectivity to be one of the greatest assets the organisation can offer in Ethiopia.⁹¹ For this reason, the UNDP has a coordinating unit that brings together partners and donors. Nevertheless, the UNDP is only one of 27 UN agencies and programmes that are currently present in Ethiopia. The UN in Addis Ababa maintains one of the largest footprints in Africa and requires commensurately effective coordination. UN activities in any given state are steered by a Country Team, which includes representatives of the 27 active UN agencies and is headed by a UN resident coordinator. As head of the given UN Country Team, the resident coordinator guides the strategic development and management of that Country Team in line with the ‘Delivering as One’ approach, and simultaneously holds the positions of humanitarian coordinator and UNDP resident representative (General Assembly of the United Nations n.d.). Applied within the Ethiopian context, the five pillars of the concept are formulated as follows:

- **‘One Programme’** – referring to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework;
- **‘One Budgetary Framework and One Fund’** – established in 2011 to support the coherent mobilisation and allocation of financial resources;
- **‘One Leader’** – achieved with the appointment of a resident director and the endorsement of standard operating procedures;
- **‘One Office’** – which is designed to streamline management procedures; and
- **‘One Voice’** – which is intended to unify outreach procedures.

The implementation of the Delivering as One reform since 2008 has been guided by a High-level Steering Committee “co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development ... with representatives from the UNCT [UN Country Team], Government ministries and donor agencies” (UN Ethiopia n.d.).

When it comes to the EU, the EU Delegation contributes to coordination and coherence efforts at the macro level. Moreover, the Governance Technical Assistance Group is headed by the EU Delegation.⁹² The vertical coordination of EU Member States is addressed by regular meetings of EU heads of cooperation and thematic ad hoc meetings. Yet, the EU Delegation is faced with the problem that, while many donors inform their partners when a project is programmed and ready to start, they fail to do so at the time of initial formulation.⁹³

⁹⁰ Interview ET01.

⁹¹ Interview ET01.

⁹² Interview ET02.

⁹³ Interview ET02.

Although the field of civil society support is contested by a range of programmes and donors, every project has its own specific focus, such as the Ethiopia Social Accountability Program Phase 2. Meanwhile, the Civil Society Support Programme concentrates on hard-to-reach categories and marginalised groups through the provision of small grants, the Tracking Trends in Ethiopia's Civil Society Project conducts research, and the Local Capacity Development Program supports capacity building and training but without providing funds. All of these activities are coordinated by the Civil Society Sector Working Group, which meets regularly. Within the EU-financed Civil Society Fund II, information on common grantees, progress and general developments in the civil society sector is shared on a bimonthly basis and through bilateral communications between programme managers.⁹⁴

Lessons identified

Aside from the issues identified above, representatives of smaller development organisations mentioned that they often felt sidelined in the race to secure local partners.⁹⁵ Even though influential donors were aware of these activities in the field, they approached local actors that would have preferred to cooperate with smaller development organisations. However, seeing the financial leverage of the more powerful external actors, local actors tend to change their focus and commit themselves to the influential partner. Nevertheless, the majority of interviewees in the development sector in Addis Ababa reported that existing mechanisms of coordination either under the auspices of DAG or smaller project-based circles were working well for members of DAG.⁹⁶ The lesson arising from this is that large donors must carefully survey the situations in which they plan to sponsor programmes, to establish whether the objectives they intend to achieve are already being met by programmes funded by smaller institutions, or whether there may be another more innovative way in which their funds could be channelled that would not distract local organisations from the work they specialise in.

Donor agencies have been involved in a number of coordinating mechanisms and have been members of working groups and steering boards. However, local interviewees suggested that projects were presented to the donors shortly before those projects were launched. Among other issues caused by a lack of transparency, opaque project formulation potentially leads to the duplication of work by donors and local actors alike. This issue is compounded by a sometimes desperate 'rally for local partners', which rules out the possibility of smaller implementing agencies participating in this process, due to a lack of financial and/or political leverage. The most important lesson arising from this is for donors to establish a longer lead-in time for the establishment of relationships with local partners, and by way of return should require a longer notice period for being informed about projects they are funding or are likely to be asked to fund.

⁹⁴ Interview ET03.

⁹⁵ Interview ET04.

⁹⁶ Interviews ET02 and ET05.

8. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Challenges of coordination and coherence

Coherence and coordination, if achieved, make for better capacity building. Yet, to coordinate well takes significant forward planning and resources, and as a result, more often than not in the cases shown in this report, coherence in capacity building has been lacking. The problems faced in any capacity building situation relate to multi-actor complexity, local ownership and sustainability. As has been shown in this report, the combination of these issues means that unless significant resources are specifically purposed for coordination, capacity building efforts are unlikely to be carried out successfully or with any lasting effect.

The challenges identified in this report centre on the capacity of international actors to coordinate in such a way as to promote horizontal, vertical and inter-institutional coherence. Still, for any hope of coherence, a lead coordinator must be designated, and in the cases highlighted in this report it is clear that EU Delegations can play this role when it comes to coordinating EU actors. Coordinating across a complex range of actors and projects is difficult. As has been surveyed in this report, few international capacity building programmes take place under the auspices of a single directing authority, able to plan and integrate activities from the top, though in some cases there may be a lead organisation tasked with a coordination and deconfliction role. This latter approach has been demonstrated to be more effective, particularly in the case of Kosovo. Even in the case of a single entity such as an international organisation, state or government department, coordinating multiple capacity building projects or coordinating between the centre and the field can be challenging. Such challenges often manifest as technical problems – of sequencing, duplication and deconfliction, for example.

In terms of vertical coherence, the cases surveyed indicate that efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States must be improved. In particular, it should be noted that none of the coordination efforts surveyed in this report are apolitical efforts: actors intervening in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa alike have conflicting political agendas. In the case of the EU in the Western Balkans, for example, some of the EU's Member States do not recognise Kosovo. Meanwhile, BiH, Kosovo and Serbia are all preparing in some manner for EU accession. As such, the EU as an actor, and its Member States, must be cognisant of the political complications arising from this situation when attempting to coordinate between different actors.

In terms of horizontal and inter-institutional coherence, the consistency of approaches is key to sustainable capacity building. The Kosovo case study has highlighted the difficulties arising from multiple conceptions of a justice system being implemented together but not in concert. To be clear, there is no issue with multiple actors working on the design and/or

implementation of any given programme. But without pre-established, centralised coordination and a clear mission, such approaches are likely to diverge as each individual effort is directed using different standard operating procedures and even objectives.

The **lessons and policy recommendations** arising from this report are as follows:

- 1) **Designate a responsible coordinator.** Any coordinated project requires one or more organisations (and named individuals within those organisations) to hold formal responsibility for that coordination effort and to store and provide corporate knowledge. This allows for centralised decision-making (and accountability for those decisions) to be established on matters of coordination. The local EU Delegation in any given context should, where possible, act as this coordinator between EU agencies deployed to that context and between EU agencies and local actors. The coordinator should also be proactive in the establishment and propagation of guidelines for other organisations, as well as arranging and chairing coordination meetings. It should be noted that this works in reverse as well: the sudden absence of a coordinator has the potential to effectively terminate a previously successful programme. This was highlighted in the case of the ‘gender community’ in Serbia. This conclusion likewise applies to the Kosovo case, where the ‘one lead nation’ approach seems to be more effective. Without a clearly defined coordinator, it is highly unlikely that any international capacity building approaches will be coherent.
- 2) **Establish a ‘rule of law’ team in the EU Delegation to ensure intra-EU coordination.** The establishment of a rule of law team within the EU Delegation creates a single point of contact for all EU components, allowing Brussels-based institutions to devolve more responsibility to Delegations, and enabling Delegations to extend their work regionally while providing policy advice to Brussels, facilitating better learning.
- 3) **Avoid ad hocism in coordination mechanisms.** Leaving the management of programmes to individuals without appropriate coordination leads to diverse, and conflicting, approaches to the same issue, as well as last-minute reactive decision-making as opposed to carefully planned predictive and strategic approaches. Ad hocism can be avoided through the design and implementation, as well as awareness raising at all levels, of long-term planning mechanisms, standard operating procedures and decision-making responsibilities.
- 4) **Ensure mandates are flexible.** Flexible mandates allow for the adaptation of priorities and missions on the part of internationals, enabling them to react effectively to rapidly changing situations, and preventing the duplication and/or overlapping of international actors’ programmes. This was particularly prevalent in BiH, where NATO and the OSCE downsized and changed the focus of their roles, allowing them to become more targeted in their actions over time. That being stated, too much flexibility can lead to ad hocism (see lesson 2). An appropriate balance must therefore be struck when determining the organisational model of decision-

making: while this must be flexible enough to allow for rapid decision-making at a relatively low level, the structure must also provide direction for lower level actors. This can be achieved by downsizing missions and decentralising responsibility for achieving objectives.

- 5) **Specify a long lead-in time for, and promote transparency in, the project formulation process, and begin coordination at the project design stage.** All projects must start and finish as a coordinated effort. This need not imply that a project must be large-scale, involving many partners, as even a project run by a single organisation with no partners requires some level of internal coordination (indeed, the latter may require significant levels of coordination). Not doing this will risk duplicating a range of resource-intensive exercises, including spending and efforts to form partnerships.
- 6) **Engage the smaller, less prominent actors, address local needs and avoid duplication.** Representatives of smaller development organisations mentioned that they often felt sidelined in the race to secure local partners. Even though influential donors were aware of these activities in the field, they approached local actors that would have preferred to cooperate with smaller development organisations. However, seeing the financial leverage of the more powerful external actors, local actors tend to change their focus and commit themselves to the influential partner. To add to the recommendation immediately above, large donors must carefully survey the situations in which they plan to sponsor programmes also to establish whether the objectives they intend to achieve are already being met by programmes funded by *smaller* institutions, or whether there may be another more innovative way in which their funds could be channelled that would not distract local organisations from the work they specialise in. Programmes should therefore begin with a comprehensive local needs assessment, but this assessment must take into account not only local needs but also what is already being done by other entities to address those needs. This requires regular, high-quality communications between appropriate local representatives and with the key personalities in other international organisations. Through this process, programmes will not just avoid overlap but can also be streamlined following the lessons identified from other similar current or past programmes, and deconflict with or compliment any forthcoming ones. Programmes will benefit from high-quality monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and priorities and missions must be flexible enough to respond to the findings of any such processes, and to rapid changes on the ground.
- 7) **Create a ‘circle of champions’.** Among local partners, individuals may be selected to assist with both the dissemination and assimilation of particular internationally-led initiatives within their networks. In BiH and Serbia, this was demonstrated to be especially beneficial. This also allows for better situation of coordination within the specificities of the local context.

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APPENDIX: INTERVIEWS

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

ID	Affiliation	Type of organisation	Interview location	Interview date
BE01	Anonymous	International actor (EU)	Brussels, Belgium	20/06/2016
BE02	Anonymous	International actor (EU)	Brussels, Belgium	20/06/2016
BH02	Anonymous	Armed forces of BiH	Sarajevo, BiH	01/11/2016
BH03	Anonymous	Think tank	Sarajevo, BiH	03/11/2016
BH04	Anonymous	International organisation	Sarajevo, BiH	03/11/2016
BH05	Anonymous	University	Sarajevo, BiH	03/11/2016
BH06	Anonymous	NGO	Sarajevo, BiH	07/11/2016
BH08	Anonymous	Embassy	Sarajevo, BiH	09/11/2016
BH09	Anonymous	International actor (EU)	Sarajevo, BiH	09/11/2016
BH11	Anonymous	Government of BiH	Sarajevo, BiH	09/11/2016
BH12	Anonymous	Government of BiH	Sarajevo, BiH	10/11/2016
BH14	Anonymous	University	Sarajevo, BiH	11/11/2016
BH16	Anonymous	NGO	Mostar, BiH	14/11/2016

SERBIA

ID	Affiliation	Type of organisation	Interview location	Interview date
RS01	International foundation	Intergovernmental	Belgrade, Serbia	23/01/2017
RS02	International organisation	Governmental	Belgrade, Serbia	17/02/2017
RS03	International organisation	Governmental	Belgrade, Serbia	23/02/2017
RS04	EU Member State Embassy	Governmental	Belgrade, Serbia	24/02/2017
RS05	Local NGO	NGO	Belgrade, Serbia	28/09/2017
RS06	EU Member State Embassy	Governmental	Belgrade, Serbia	06/03/2017
RS07	International foundation	NGO	Belgrade, Serbia	19/10/2017

KOSOVO

ID	Affiliation	Type of organisation	Interview location	Interview date
KS01	Anonymous	Kosovo civil society	Pristina, Kosovo	27/03/2017
KS02	International organisation	Governmental	Pristina, Kosovo	30/03/2017
KS03	International organisation	Governmental	Pristina, Kosovo	21/04/2017
KS04	Former Kosovo Police employee	Governmental	Pristina, Kosovo	30/01/2017
KS05	Anonymous	Kosovo civil society	Pristina, Kosovo	02/02/2017
KS06	EU official	EU	Pristina, Kosovo	02/02/2017
KS07	Group interview with 8 managers of an international organisation	International organisation	Pristina, Kosovo	30/03/2017
KS08	Kosovo government employee	Governmental	Pristina, Kosovo	30/01/2017
KS09	Anonymous	Intergovernmental	Pristina, Kosovo	01/02/2017
KS10	Anonymous	International organisation	Mitrovica, Kosovo	21/04/2017
KS11	Group interview with EULEX	Intergovernmental	Pristina, Kosovo	12/07/2017
KS12	EU Office	Intergovernmental	Pristina, Kosovo	30/03/2017
KS13	International organisation	Governmental	Pristina, Kosovo	29/03/2017

HORN OF AFRICA

ID	Affiliation	Type of organisation	Interview location	Interview date
HA01	Ministry of Defense	Governmental	Mogadishu, Somalia	04/10/2016
HA02	Ministry of Interior	Governmental	Mogadishu, Somalia	08/10/2016
HA03	Ministry of Defense	Governmental	Mogadishu, Somalia	11/10/2016
HA04	Somali Police Force	Governmental	Mogadishu, Somalia	10/10/2016

ETHIOPIA

ID	Affiliation	Type of organisation	Interview location	Interview date
ET01	Anonymous	International organisation	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	11/10/2016
ET02	Anonymous	International organisation	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	12/10/2016
ET03	Anonymous	International organisation	Via email	21/12/2016
ET04	Anonymous	Bilateral organisation	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	18/10/2016
ET05	Anonymous	Bilateral organisation	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	19/10/2016
ET06	Anonymous	Bilateral organisation	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	14/10/2016