



# EU-CIVCAP

Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU  
CIVilian CAPabilities for a sustainable peace

## **The EU's Comprehensive Approach and its Implementation**

Deliverable 5.4

(Version 2.3; 29 November 2018)

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This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 653227.

### Summary of the Document

<b>Title</b>	DL 5.4 The EU's Comprehensive Approach and its Implementation
<b>Last modification</b>	29 November 2018
<b>State</b>	Final
<b>Version</b>	2.3
<b>Leading Partner</b>	Roskilde University (RUC)
<b>Other Participant Partners</b>	Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), Transparency Solutions (TS)
<b>Authors</b>	Peter Horne Zartsdahl, Katarina Đokić and Savannah Simons
<b>Audience</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Public <input type="checkbox"/> Restricted <input type="checkbox"/> Internal
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This report is an assessment of the implementation of the EU Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. It provides a framework for assessment and an indicative analysis based on field research from both regions.</p>
<b>Keywords</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• European Union (EU)</li> <li>• Conflict prevention</li> <li>• Peacebuilding</li> <li>• Comprehensive approach</li> <li>• Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)</li> <li>• Integrated approach</li> </ul>

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AFBiH</b>	Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>AWE</b>	Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives
<b>BiH</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>CA</b>	Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises (EU)
<b>CBT</b>	Capacity Building and Training
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CMC</b>	Crisis Management Concepts (EU)
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>DG NEAR</b>	Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
<b>EEAS</b>	European External Action Service
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUAM</b>	European Union Advisory Mission (Ukraine)
<b>EUCAP</b>	European Union Capacity Building Mission
<b>EUFOR</b>	European Union Force (BiH)
<b>EUNAVFOR</b>	European Union Naval Force
<b>EULEX</b>	European Union Rule of Law Mission (Kosovo)
<b>EUO</b>	EU Office (Kosovo)
<b>EUPM</b>	European Union Police Mission
<b>EUSR</b>	European Union Special Representative
<b>EUTM</b>	European Union Training Mission
<b>HoM</b>	Head of Mission
<b>HR/VP</b>	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
<b>IA</b>	Integrated Approach to external conflict and crises (EU)
<b>ICSP</b>	Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace
<b>IPA</b>	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Government Organisation

<b>KFOR</b>	Kosovo Force
<b>LOT</b>	Liaison and Observation Team
<b>MIA</b>	Mogadishu International Airport
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MSO</b>	Mission Security Officers (MSO)
<b>NSE</b>	National Support Element
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>OHR</b>	Office of High Representative
<b>OSCE</b>	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>PFCA</b>	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
<b>PIC</b>	Peace Implementation Council (BiH)
<b>PRISM</b>	Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation
<b>SAA</b>	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
<b>SFOR</b>	Stabilisation Force
<b>SNA</b>	Somali National Army
<b>SNAF</b>	Somali National Armed Forces
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>TAIEX</b>	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNMIK</b>	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>UNSOM</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
<b>UNSOS</b>	United Nations Support Office in Somalia

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For more than a decade, coherence in multidimensional responses to conflicts and crises has been a clearly articulated priority for international organisations engaged in conflict management and peacebuilding. For the European Union (EU), a key policy framework to achieve this goal has been the comprehensive approach (CA) (European Commission, 2013). Following the articulation of the EU's Global Strategy (2016), this framework has been superseded by a wider integrated approach (IA), reaching beyond the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Faleg et al., 2018). On the eclipse of the comprehensive approach, this report explores a single pertinent question: **To what degree was the comprehensive approach ever implemented on the ground?** This question is answered by appraising the degree to which the policy has been implemented in two diverse cases: the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. For each case, the degree of implementation is assessed in relation to eight specific policy measures and their associated action points, as articulated by the Joint Communication on the Comprehensive Approach of 2013.

The study finds that while the comprehensive approach has yielded many positive steps towards a more coherent EU external action under the CSDP, a number of policy elements were never seriously pursued on the ground. Chief among them have been the establishment of shared conflict risk analysis, joint reporting, better use of EU Delegations, and working in local partnerships. Some elements of the policy have reached higher degrees of implementation in recent engagements, such as in the Horn of Africa, including the forging of a common strategic vision, a long(er)-term commitment and a focus on prevention and strategic adaptability in dynamic environments. But few of these efforts have reached successful implementation in both case areas; and by association, the successes found are not necessarily indicative of successes elsewhere in EU external interventions.

Overall, the persistent challenges to coherence in EU external action on the ground are rooted more in structural challenges than in the scope and intent of the policy itself. This does not bode well for the future of the new integrated approach unless key structural impediments to implementation at the operational level are addressed. The EU therefore must implement in full all the measures of the comprehensive approach before putting its faith in a new policy framework with comparatively fewer assessable and observable measures to facilitate coherence.

## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IN BRIEF

**1. A strategy of coherence requires leadership and ownership.** The implementation of the comprehensive approach lacked clear leadership and ownership, and the new and wider integrated approach is not likely to succeed unless these shortcomings are addressed. Ownership has recently and partly been established at the strategic level through the creation of the EEAS Division PRISM (Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation), but without endowing it with real decision-making capabilities, and a similar mediating entity at the operational level is still missing. Leadership and ownership could be increased through several of the more detailed recommendations below, but all of those require resourcing and incentives that have not yet been provided in sufficient quantity. Operational coordination is a constant practical struggle that must be continually resourced. Continuing to ask parties to pursue a 'spirit of harmonisation', rather than directly tasking and incentivizing is not likely to increase coherence in EU external action by any reasonable measure.

**2. The comprehensive approach should be implemented in full.** Before announcing the demise of the comprehensive approach, the EEAS must introspectively examine why its actions were never carried out and focus on implementation before subsuming its neglected policy measures into a wider and less-lucid framework of integration. In particular, the EU should focus its attention on measures that have not yet been successfully implemented, such as the development of shared conflict risk analysis, joint reporting, better use of EU Delegations and working in local partnerships.

**3. Best practices from the Horn of Africa should be duplicated in other contexts.** The Horn of Africa holds some good practices that warrant duplication elsewhere. Key among them are the establishment of a common strategic vision between member states, the EU Delegation and CSDP missions, as well as the long(er)-term commitment and focus on prevention created through coordination with the UN and larger EU member states. The exchange of staff and support between EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia are also examples to follow in terms of civil-military synergies and cooperation across the institutional divide.

**4. The EU should integrate leadership structures on the operational level and delegate decision-making.** There are few if any direct incentives for CSDP missions and operations to co-ordinate with horizontal partners and most activities of coordination focus solely on sharing of information and remain vulnerable to personal interpretations by mission leadership. As long as EU instruments are not integrated in some way or form at the operational level, managing incentives and coordination between them will continue to be severely challenged. When acting in conflict and crisis environments, coherence in action

must be coordinated and led from the field. This requires a revision of the resourcing and staffing of EU Delegations as envisaged in the comprehensive approach and a more flexible exchange of resources and support between the EU Delegation and CSDP missions and instruments. This would most effectively be achieved by integrating chains of command.

**5. The EU must at a minimum provide resources for operational and tactical level-conflict analysis and simple system(s) for sharing sensitive and operational information between its instruments.** A sub-element to the integration of operational-level leadership is the persistent challenge caused by a lack of shared conflict analysis and systems for sharing sensitive and operational information. In the absence of a common operational picture available to all EU staff, coherence will remain severely challenged. The information shared should include common EU positions and explanations of positions where member states diverge, so that all EU staff are able to act and be perceived to represent a unified bloc by local partners, particularly host nation governments.



## 1. INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, coherence in multidimensional responses to conflicts and crises has been a clearly articulated priority for all international organisations engaged in peace and stability operations (de Coning & Friis, 2011; Gross, 2008; de Coning, 2008; Algar-Faria et al., 2018). Whether they are the United Nations' and African Union's integrated approaches, NATO's comprehensive approach or the European Union's strategies of the same name(s), all aim – with minor variations – to create coherence across a variety of policy instruments ranging from diplomacy and humanitarian assistance to full-scale military operations, with the EU managing what is likely the widest range of instruments under one single organisation (European Commission, 2013, p.3; Faleg et al., 2018).

In 2013, the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (CA) put forward eight policy goals for increased coherence in the use of EU external instruments (European Commission, 2013). Five years on, this policy has been recast under the new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) (2016) as the basis of a “wider-scoped” Integrated Approach (IA) lauded for being “more about substance and less about process [than the CA]” (EEAS, 2018). In short, the EU's comprehensive approach, at least in name, is becoming obsolete. This report therefore provides a timely assessment of the comprehensive approach in its original form and the success with which its eight central policy measures have been implemented in the field before it is eclipsed by a strategy of coherence,<sup>1</sup> which may sport a new name, but is likely to face many of the same objectives and challenges.

This deliverable contributes to the wider work of EU-CIVCAP by providing a comparative assessment of the success with which the EU's comprehensive approach, as a policy framework guiding the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has been implemented in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa since 2013. The study aims to assess the extent to which the internal goal achievement of EU coherence, considering the implementation of the eight policy objectives identified by the EU itself. This adds to the efforts of previous studies discussing the overall coherence of efforts at the political-strategic level (e.g. Faleg et al., 2018) and between member states, international actors and the EU (e.g. Gross, 2008; Barry, 2012; Furness & Olsen, 2016) by analysing in depth the implementation of the comprehensive approach at the operational level.

The report proceeds as follows. **Chapter two** introduces the analytical framework for assessing the internal goal attainment of the comprehensive approach based on the measures articulated in the 2013 Joint Communication and their associated indicators. **Chapter three** proceeds to analyse each of the eight measures across the two cases. The **fourth and final**

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<sup>1</sup> A strategy of coherence is understood here as an all-encompassing term for international organisations' policies for coherence in multidimensional or sectoral engagements (see de Coning & Friis, 2011).

**chapter** briefly summarises the findings and compares the case studies to provide an indicative assessment of the overall goal attainment within the EU's comprehensive approach since its articulation in 2013.

The report builds on original empirical data collected through document analysis, 67 structured and semi-structured interviews (see Annex 1) and field observations in two case areas spanning five EU CSDP missions, three EU Delegations and several external regional partners and member states' embassies. The high number of indicators and the limited number of cases allow for a thorough assessment of all relevant elements of the policy, but also limit the depth with which each indicator can be analysed and thus the potential for causal inference. The conclusions should therefore be considered as indicative, and subsequent exploration and collation of data on each indicator is highly encouraged in support of the implementation of the EU's integrated approach.

## 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Although the idea of seeking coherence between policy instruments is not new, the comprehensive approach as a consistent policy framework was first articulated after the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security (HR/VP) under the Treaty of Lisbon (Faleg et al., 2018, pp.15–17).<sup>2</sup> The establishment of the CA policy was driven by a realisation that the complexity of the EU's institutions and wide array of external policy instruments required concerted and centralised direction (Juncos & Pomorska, 2014; Gross & Juncos, 2011; Smith, 2017). Initially, however, the concept was applied mostly as an abstruse principle for organising EU action. As EEAS engagements continued to increase in scope and number, a Joint Communication was adopted (European Commission, 2013) which set out the HR/VP and European Commission's common understanding of the policy by formulating a number of concrete steps to guide EU external action (Faleg et al., 2018, p.17).

The 2013 Joint Communication provides eight overall measures to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of EU external action through all stages of engagement in areas of conflict and crises, from early warning and preparedness to sustainable long-term recovery. To assess the overall success with which the policy has been implemented in the field, an analytical framework was drawn directly from these eight main measures as they were set out in the Joint Communication on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (2013) (see Box 1).

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<sup>2</sup> See also Faleg et al. (2018) for a more detailed historical and political-strategic analysis of the comprehensive (*nunc* integrated) approach.

1. Develop a shared analysis
2. Define a common strategic vision
3. Focus on prevention
4. Mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU
5. Commit to the long term
6. Linking policies and internal and external action
7. Make better use of EU Delegations
8. Work in partnership

*Box 1: Policy measures of the comprehensive approach*

For each policy objective, the document provides between two and six “action points” of varying measurability. To manage the scope of research and establish indicators of reasonable clarity and commensurability, only a limited number of action points were selected for this study and recast as indicators for each measure. For each objective, between one and three indicators were developed based on (1) associated action points, (2) a need for measurability, (3) expected data access, and (4) methodological tools available for EU-CIVCAP research – namely semi-structured and structured interviews, field observations, and document analysis. The associated indicators are not exhaustive of the measures and actions listed in the original policy, but together they make up a sample of indicative points for a general assessment of success under each of the eight main objectives. Each measure was rephrased as an assessable and answerable sub-research question, and from the associated action points, a total of 16 indicators were developed as follows:

1. Is there a shared analysis and is it being used?
  - a. Is there coherence between PRISM, EU Delegations, CSDP HQs and member state embassies in their understanding of (1) EU objectives and (2) regional conflict analysis?
  - b. Is there a shared document articulating (1) nature of the regional challenges or core problem, (2) why the EU should act (based on interests, values, objectives and mandates), and (3) the available, and most suitable, instruments to act with?
2. Is there a common strategic vision for the region?
  - a. Does the strategy include both member states' and EU objectives and priorities for the region or country?
3. Has there been a focus on prevention?
  - a. To what degree could or should earlier action have been possible?
4. Were different strengths and capacities of the EU mobilised?

- a. Are EU Delegations effectively creating coherence between EU and member states' activities?
  - b. Does the Delegation conduct or contribute to ongoing conflict risk analysis?
  - c. Have joint field missions (EEAS, Commission, member states) been conducted?
5. Is there a focus on long-term commitment?
  - a. Is there a coordination system and plan for long-term and short-term objectives?
  - b. Is there effective pooling and sharing of European capacities and coordinating and combining EU tools and instruments?
  - c. Is there an effective use of lessons learned?
6. Is there coherence between policies and internal and external actions?
  - a. Is there coherence between external actions and objectives, and internal policies?
7. Are the EU Delegations utilised to the expected extent?
  - a. Is there joint reporting with member states?
  - b. Is there 'breadth' of expertise in EU Delegations, and is their structure dynamic and context-adaptive?
  - c. Have other EU actors or institutions co-located with delegations?
8. Are EU external actions conducted in partnership with international organisations and regional actors?
  - a. Are missions developed in a way that takes into account the role of others?
  - b. Are EU missions and Delegations engaging closely with major international non-government organisations (INGOs), civil society, think-tanks, and academia?

Indicators have been phrased as individual sub-research questions and associated with (1) a number of structured interview questions and observation points (some direct, some indirect), (2) a group of relevant respondents organised by respondent type and assignment of interview questions, and (3) a number of specific research tasks including comparative document analysis and identification and review of specified sub-policies and regional strategies.<sup>3</sup>

The collected data was analysed to assess each indicator on a scale of four levels of goal attainment: (1) **No**, there is no observable attainment of the indicator in the given region; (2) **Partial low**, there is some observable attainment of the indicator, but not sufficient to be considered successful; (3) **Partial high**, there is observable attainment of the indicator, but considerable room for improvement; and (4) **Yes**, there is a high degree of attainment, with little or no immediate room for improvement. The indicators for a given policy goal were then

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<sup>3</sup> E.g. the presence of a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) (European Commission, 2013, pp.5–6),

considered in aggregate for a combined assessment of goal attainment in the associated measure (1 through 8) – and the case variance analysed to indicate generalizability. See Table 1 below for an example of the framework, and Annex 2 for the complete results.

EU goals for Comprehensive Approach (2013)	Horn of Africa	Western Balkans
1. Is there a shared analysis, and is it being used?	Yes	Partial high
a. Is there coherence between PRISM, EU delegations, CSDP HQs and member state embassies in their understanding of (1) EU objectives and (2) regional conflict analysis?		
b. Is there a shared document articulating (1) nature of the regional challenges/problem, (2) why EU should act based on interests, values, objectives and mandates), and (3) the available, and best suited, instruments to act with?	Partial low	No
2. Is there a common strategic vision for the region?	EXAMPLE	
a. Does the strategy include both member states' and EU objectives and priorities for the region or country?		
3. Has there been a focus on prevention?		
a. To what degree could or should earlier action have been possible?		
4. Were different strengths mobilized?		
a. Are EU delegations effectively creating coherence between EU and member states' activities?		
b. Does the delegation conduct or contribute to ongoing conflict risk analysis?		
c. Have joint field missions (EEAS, commission, member states) been conducted?		
5. Is there a focus on long-term commitment?		
a. Is there a coordination system and plan for long-term and short-term objectives?		
b. Are European capacities pooled and shared, and are tools and instruments combined and coordinated?		
c. Are lessons identified effectively learned?		
6. Is there coherence between policies and internal and external actions?		
a. Is there coherence between external actions and objectives, and internal policies?		
7. Are the EU delegations utilized to the expected intent?		
a. Is there joint reporting with member states?		
b. Is there 'breadth' of expertise in EU delegations, and is their structure dynamic and context-adaptive?		
c. Have other EU actors or institutions co-located with delegations?		
8. Are EU external actions conducted in partnership with international organisations and regional actors?		
a. Are missions developed in a way that takes into account the roles of other actors?		
b. Are EU missions and delegations engaging closely with major INGOs, civil society, think-tanks and academia?		

*Table 1: Example of goal attainment matrix. For detailed results, see Annex 2*

The report applies the analytical framework to two cases: the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. These areas have been selected as diverse case studies (Gerring, 2012, p.51), representing regional EU interventions at two different points of the conflict cycle with a variance in (1) capabilities engaged, (2) duration of EU involvement, and (3) proximity to the European neighbourhood. Variation on the conflict environment allows for an assessment of applicability of EU instruments along the full spectrum of conflict intensity and engagements. Variation in the historical extent of EU engagement and the coherence of member states' interests allows for diversity in the likelihood of policy implementation success – and thus for a broader generalisation of findings present across both case areas. The cases are considered to be representative variations on a continuum of EU engagements, with the Horn of Africa as a most recent and more likely case for successful implementation of the comprehensive approach, and the Western Balkans as a historically important area of EU engagement, but one where many EU member states' national interests and regional politics influence the consistency and coherence with which capabilities can be deployed in a joined-up manner (see Peen Rodt et al., 2017).

The Western Balkans have been a testing ground of the CSDP since its very origins. The EU's engagements in this region have been as much a litmus test for the Union's ability to act strategically as a security provider in its own right as it has been a means to de-escalate conflict in the Balkans (Peen Rodt et al., 2017; Juncos, 2013). Today the Western Balkans are

at the lower end of the conflict scale, where engagements are mostly aimed at capacity-building of institutions, conflict prevention and economic assistance in a relatively permissive environment. The EU engagements in the region have also resulted in a number of disagreements among member states, such as for instance regarding the status of Kosovo, making it difficult to reach consensus on CSDP mandates. No new CSDP operations or missions have been deployed in the region since 2008, and existing mandates for the two ongoing missions (EUFOR BiH and EULEX Kosovo) have been only incrementally adapted to new regional policies (Peen Rodt et al., 2017). The Western Balkans is therefore characterised as a low-intensity environment, with a focus on conflict prevention. Engagements taken prior to the launch of the CA, however, reveal varying and sometimes conflicting member state interests. Thus, it is considered a less likely scenario for regional coherence among CSDP instruments.

In comparison, the Union's CSDP engagements in and off the Horn of Africa only began with the deployment of EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta) in 2008. Subsequent operations in the region (EUTM-A and EUCAP) were developed concurrently with the CA, the EU's regional strategy (Council of the European Union, 2011) and its associated action plans (Council of the European Union, 2015). Supporting the prospects for successful ongoing coordination, EU member states' interests in the region are quite uniform, perceiving the continued instability in the Horn of Africa as a direct security risk to the Union's maritime interests and as a cauldron of potential migration challenges (Smith, 2017; Peen Rodt et al., 2017). The operational environment in and off the Horn of Africa is varied in conflict intensity, but the majority of engagements now focus on the executive anti-piracy operation (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) and capacity-building of Somali security structures (EUCAP and EUTM Somalia). The general context is one of ongoing Somali insurgency by Al-Shabaab and thus a conflict where even the prevention of state collapse may not – yet – be fully out of the picture. The case is therefore characterised as a medium-to-high-intensity conflict with a focus on containment of threats and emboldening of the Somali state, and as a region with mainly uniform member state interests. It is considered a comparatively more likely scenario for regional coherence and policy implementation among CSDP instruments.

The study consequently expects to find that (1) more elements of the CA have been successfully implemented in the Horn of Africa than in the Western Balkans (adjusting for the more restrictive conflict environment), which will confirm the thesis of a less and more likely case diversity; and (2) that policy measures found to have reached similar levels of implementation in both cases (whether failing or successful) are generalisable to wider EU external actions. By contrast, single-case successes would indicate either (a) instruments of a particular applicability to the specific environment (likely in both cases), or (b) initial stages of success in policy implementation that have yet to become best practices elsewhere (more likely in the Horn of Africa).

### 3. ASSESSMENT OF THE EU'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The following analysis builds on an overarching mapping exercise carried out by Peen Rodt et al. (2017) covering EU strategic intentions, capabilities and engagements in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. This chapter gives a brief overview of the EU's current engagements in these two regions, followed by an assessment of its implementation of the eight policy objectives of the comprehensive approach.<sup>4</sup>

The EU's engagement in the Western Balkans has shaped the emergence and consolidation of the comprehensive (*nunc* integrated) approach (Interviews 1, 2 and 3). The ongoing EU missions and operations in the Western Balkans are not based on independently developed EU Crisis Management Concepts (CMC). Both EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and EULEX in Kosovo followed efforts by other international actors: EUFOR took over the mandate to maintain a safe and secure environment from the NATO-led Security Force (SFOR), while EULEX assumed its rule of law mandate from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Both in BiH and Kosovo the EU continues to be dependent on close cooperation with external partners, especially organisations formally overseeing the international legal framework for peace. In BiH, a *sui generis* body, the High Representative, monitors compliance with civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement (the so-called Dayton Accord), whereas EUFOR monitors military aspects. In Kosovo, UNMIK is still the formal safeguard of UNSCR 1244 and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) provides a military presence in accordance with this resolution. A myriad of other international actors, including several EU member states, are active in the field, providing political, technical and financial support to post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding, institution building (including Security Sector Reform), and social and economic development. In Kosovo, the US wields the strongest political influence, with one observer noting that "the space left for the EU is really small compared to the US" (Interview 4). This reinforces the need for the commitment undertaken in the comprehensive approach to work in partnerships.

The EU engagements in the Horn of Africa have been guided by the strategic regional framework (Council of the European Union, 2011) and the corresponding action plans (2015). Engagements range widely from the appointment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) to assist in establishing coherence from EEAS to ECHO to the deployment of a plethora of thematic and geographical instruments. These include development cooperation through the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and bilateral programmes from member states; humanitarian funding and programming through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO); the Instrument for Stability (IfS); and

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<sup>4</sup> For further details on the EU's regional strategic frameworks, engagements and capabilities mentioned in the analysis, see Peen Rodt et al. (2017).



the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (Soliman et al., 2012). In addition, the region has seen the deployment of four different CSDP missions, three of which are still running. These include the EUNAVFOR, a regional maritime security operation led from Northwood, UK; the EUTM Somalia, a military training mission aimed at building capacity and providing strategic advice and training to the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF); and the civilian EUCAP Somalia<sup>5</sup> contributing to the establishment and capacity building of Somalia's maritime civilian law enforcement capability.

### 3.1. DEVELOPING A SHARED ANALYSIS

The CA specifies the need for a coherent understanding of both EU objectives and regional conflict dynamics in a shared analysis common to CSDP headquarters, member states, the EU Delegations and PRISM (indicator 1.a). It furthermore specifies, that a shared document, the Political Framework for Crisis Analysis (PFCA), should articulate: (1) the nature of the regional challenges, (2) why the EU should act, and (3) the available and most suitable instruments for action (indicator 1.b).

In the Western Balkans, the overall EU approach to stabilisation and conflict prevention has been intertwined with the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which links stabilisation with prospects of EU accession. In terms of peacebuilding, the idea of EU integration has granted a unique role for the EU in the Balkan peacebuilding processes, but also for the Western Balkans in EU internal policies (Interview 5). Among EU institutions and member states, there is a common understanding that the enlargement policy framework has dominance and that priorities for the region are set forth in European Commission communications and country reports (Interviews 2 and 6). For years, the rule of law sector has engaged the highest number of international actors, including EULEX in Kosovo, the EUSR, the EU Delegation (Sarajevo) and the EU office (Kosovo) as well as several member states. Numerous coordination meetings and fora have been organised for actors engaged in the sector in both BiH and Kosovo, with high levels of information sharing and political coordination reflecting a well-established common understanding of the situation (Interviews 7 and 8).

It appears, however, that the shared political and development priorities do not stem from a shared analysis, but rather from parallel analyses producing similar conclusions. Member states' strategic planning is conducted as a bilateral process with partner governments and the degree of involvement of EU and other international actors depends on the individual member state. The international coordination taking place is mostly about information sharing on ongoing activities rather than joint analysis (Interviews 9, 10 and 11). This reflects

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<sup>5</sup> Previously called EUCAP Nestor.



a broader picture that emerged across multi-actor sectors;<sup>6</sup> the EU has not developed a common position nor a strategic analysis regarding the countries under the responsibility of DG NEAR. At the operational level this is replicated with a lack of shared analysis on security developments. In BiH, information sharing among EU actors is more advanced than in Kosovo, but the anticipated leading role of the EU Delegation as a focal point for a shared analysis (Interview 12) has not materialised, as it does not carry out conflict analysis tasks beyond context monitoring (Interview 13). Both indicators are therefore assessed as *partial low*.

In the Horn of Africa, the Strategic Framework developed by the Council (Council of the European Union, 2011; 2015) fulfils most of the criteria for the Political Framework for Crisis Approach, but only a small number of EU staff working in CSDP missions and operations are familiar with the document and the EU's regional priorities (Interviews 14, 15, 16 and 17). There is, however, more consistency in the understanding among senior EU CSDP staff, the EU Delegation and the member states of the central conflict dynamics and the main challenges for sustainable peace, as well of the EU's overarching regional objectives (Interviews 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 26). In general, the strategic-level framework for shared analysis seems to be well-established. Several respondents commented, however, on the challenges of reaching a common and shared analysis of ongoing operational developments. Interestingly, this was found to be more prevalent among the respondents based in Mogadishu compared to those based in Nairobi, where many member states as well as the EU Delegation for Somalia have their primary offices. Among member state embassies the interfaces and coordination with the EU Delegation have been varied in scope, but generally the delegation has been found to be available and engaged in information sharing, although without playing a leading role in conflict analysis or coordination (Interviews 23 and 24; see also section 3.4). In Mogadishu, where actors are in closer proximity with one another, albeit with lower freedom of movement, exchanges between representatives have been less forward-looking and the EU Delegation has only taken a modest role in coordinating the EU presence (Interviews 20 and 25). Moreover, the interfaces between the EU Delegation and the CSDP missions and operations have been influenced by the personal interpretation of coordinating responsibilities by the missions and the Delegation's leadership (Interviews 20 and 26; see also section 3.4). In general, there has been no basis for ongoing shared or common conflict analysis at the operational level, but the requirements for the PFCA and coherent strategic understanding have been met. The coherence of understanding between strategic partners (indicator 1.a) is therefore assessed as *partial high* and the presence of a PFCA (indicator 1.b) is assessed in the positive, i.e. *yes*, with a note regarding the lack of discussion of alternative instruments.

In sum, when it comes to developing a shared analysis, the Horn of Africa attains a *partial high* rating, whereas the Western Balkans achieve an aggregate assessment of *partial low*.

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<sup>6</sup> Specifically, interfaces and positions in the sectors of security and reconciliation were reviewed.

### 3.2. COMMON STRATEGIC VISION

The CA specifies the need for a common strategic vision, including the EU's and member states' objectives and priorities for particular countries, as appropriate. These are explored as one indicator (2.a); whether there is a common strategic vision for the region and if it includes both member state and EU objectives and priorities for it.

In the Western Balkans, the overall strategic approach of the EU has been communicated in numerous documents, most notably in Commission communications (the latest one from February 2018; European Commission, 2018) and in the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with individual countries. But, strategies aside, it is frequently noted in the field that EU member state positions on several Western Balkan countries are divergent (Interviews 4, 27 and 28). Five member states do not recognise Kosovo's independence, and the EU's avoidance of openly addressing this divergence has created a perception of the EU as a somewhat fragmented actor (Interview 27). Some member states do not necessarily see their actions as complementary to the EU (Interview 29), and locals and international observers struggle to see a unified approach (Interview 10). A senior EU official potentially summed up the dilemma: "There is no joint EU approach to Kosovo, and Kosovo is a highly toxic political subject. It is our inherited duty, but emotions are still too strong for proper coherence" (Interview 12). In BiH, numerous member states are considered more or less partisan in the local political struggles between the two entities (Interview 28).

The EU's objectives, potential engagements and priority actions for the Horn of Africa are outlined in significant detail in the strategic framework and regional action plan (Council of the European Union, 2011; 2015). These documents, however, do not include the objectives of the member states, as proposed by the CA. While there is less discrepancy between member states' objectives for the Horn of Africa than for the Western Balkans (Interviews 17 and 23, see also Peen Rodt et al., 2017), there are still significant differences in member states' engagements and priorities, which are not reflected in the regional framework. While the document contains coherent and aggregate objectives, it does not deliver on the aim specifying that "Joint framework documents should set out the EU's and Member States' objectives and priorities for particular countries as appropriate" (European Commission, 2013, p.6). Given the EU's wide engagement in the Horn of Africa and in Somalia in particular, many member states are also involved in bilateral projects, with the result that, much like in the Western Balkans, local partners sometimes find that there are too many actors with too many – seemingly – overlapping activities, which, in the words of a Somali official, "all stem from different long-term agendas" (Interview 30).

The indicator for a common strategic vision including member state positions (2.a.) is set as *partial low* for the Western Balkans and as *partial high* for the Horn of Africa. It seems, however, that shortcomings in both cases are driven by a lack of (1) coherence between

member states' objectives (high variance in Western Balkans, low variance in Horn of Africa), and (2) adherence to EU frameworks (with individual outliers in both cases). The latter is seen by Brussels as often being violated by individual member states after strategic agreement (Interview 12). Given the vast number of bilateral programmes between member states and countries in both the Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans, where local stakeholders often perceive too much intervention by too many actors (Interviews 4, 27, 30, 31 and 32), it would be of value to outline bilateral priorities in the PFCA and the regional framework to avoid duplication and contradictions and to increase general awareness of partners' engagements. It is of no surprise to any respondents that EU member states at times have taken divergent positions compared to the EU. However, it would help partners as much as EU staff if these varying positions were addressed more openly, as greater transparency could in turn help clarify some of the mystique of EU decision-making.

### 3.3. FOCUS ON PREVENTION

In focusing on prevention, the CA calls for two specific actions: (1) using early warning and early action systems informed by local sensors and analysis to identify emerging conflict and possible mitigating actions; and (2) to work across EU institutions and with member states to translate conflict risk analyses into informed prevention measures (European Commission, 2013, p.7). The analysis in this section focuses mainly on prevention through the flexibility and adaptability of the ongoing engagements in the two regions to first notice and secondly take action to prevent negative developments. It also asks to what degree earlier action could or should have been possible (indicator 3.a).

EU institutions at the strategic level generally rely on EU Delegations for advice if "something is simmering" and data on situational developments in the field are also collected through EU-financed projects and contacts with other international organisations (Interviews 6 and 33). In addition, most CSDP missions and operations include some form of security risk analysis capacity, ranging from traditional military intelligence sections with a capacity to perform trend and threat analysis to the Mission Security Officers (MSOs) in civilian missions, who are engaged mostly in practical security matters (Interview 34). Recently, EU Delegations have begun to include specialists with more security-relevant analytical capabilities (Interview 12).<sup>7</sup> The coordination and exchange of information from Delegations and missions to Brussels is therefore vital for preventive efforts, but the utilisation of EU staff expertise at the operational level has been limited (Interviews 14, 26 and 34).

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<sup>7</sup> Examples include counter-terrorism and migration experts who may help inform conflict risk analysis, but have so far proved unable to provide "useful intelligence" (Interviews 12 and 34).

The Western Balkans is currently not a focus area of the EEAS' early warning and conflict analysis because the "negotiating framework provides for peacebuilding" (Interviews 6 and 33). This is despite the fact that there is a well-warranted awareness that loss of faith in the EU accession process among local partners may give rise to "destabilising factors" (Interview 6). In practice, the EU Office, EULEX and the EUSR all obtain information and assessments from other international actors with a more significant field presence (such as KFOR, OSCE and UNMIK). But the mission does not have the staff capacity to stay informed about reports (Interview 5), and local respondents noted that the EU's presence in northern Kosovo had now all but disappeared following the death of a mission staff member in 2013 (Interview 35). This has left a blind spot in the EU's early warning and response in one of the most conflict-prone and tense situations in the region (Emini & Stakic, 2018).<sup>8</sup> Adding insult to injury, the political leadership in Serb-majority northern Kosovo has been left out of the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue – commonly known as the Brussels Dialogue – negotiating *inter alia* the integration of this particular area. EU grant schemes and funding for civil society development have also been widely perceived as targeting partial political appeasement rather than long-term development (Interviews 36 and 37; Jakovljevic et al., 2016). The dialogue as well as EU funding has been perceived as negligent towards the local context and population, and potentially counterproductive to peace and stability as northern Kosovars are feeling increasingly marginalised and excluded by the EU-led processes (Interviews 35, 36 and 38). The EU Office and EULEX maintain some field presence and the EUSR has engaged in critical situations such as the "Wall Crisis" in 2017 (Aliu, 2017),<sup>9</sup> but reports and early warning have not been sufficiently forward-looking, and the actions have been consistently reactive.

In the Horn of Africa, there is a continuous perception among respondents – both internal and external to the EU – that it is, as an actor at the operational level, highly reactive and very rarely has adapted fluently to a changing environment (Interviews 14, 30, 32, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44). Examples include the EU's actions in the 2017 joint coordination of drought relief (OCHA, 2017), where partners perceived its participation as interested but slow in adaptation and delivery of support (Interviews 17, 43 and 45), and general coordination among EU CSDP instruments and the EU Delegation under the comprehensive approach (Interviews 14, 19 and 26). This includes the reassignment of assets between instruments to respond to emerging needs, where CSDP staff face bureaucratic obstacles and Brussels-level decision-making as recurring challenges to flexible operations (Interviews 14, 16, 17, 26 and 46). At the strategic level, however, the EU has demonstrated a long-term commitment in support of the establishment of the Somali Federal Government (see also section 3.5) and has adapted CSDP missions and operations as short-term responses to a changing environment (Interviews 14,

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<sup>8</sup> For more detailed information on northern Kosovo, see Peen Rodt et al., 2017, section 3.

<sup>9</sup> In 2016-17, a 2-meter high wall was erected on the banks of the Ibar River in Northern Mitrovica, after tensions arose over the reopening of the bridge between southern (ethnically Albanian) and northern (ethnically Serbian) parts of the city.

32 and 40). Examples here include the gradual refocusing of the training programme for the EUTM, including the relocation of training activities from Uganda to Mogadishu, and the repurposing of EUCAP Nestor into EUCAP Somalia (Interviews 14, 25 and 26). There is, however, confusion as to the priorities and decision-making processes of the EU among the local political partners. Several respondents describe EU CSDP activities as halfway implementations that do not leave a clear understanding of why certain actions are possible, while others are not (Interviews 30, 31, 32 and 44). The restrictions associated with military capacity building provide an illustrative example:

“We work with the EU, and they want to train our army. We let them. But then they train and train but provide no equipment. They do not go where the army operates [...] I mean, we are thankful, but the UAE and the Turkish, the Americans and the English, they provide a full package. Of course, that is sometimes better for us. [...] What I like about the EU is that they act like they have fewer hidden agendas [...] That is also better for Somalia.” (Interview 32).

This is a frustration shared at both the operational and strategic level of the EU, where a focus on training with no capacity for equipping is continuously seen as hampering effective impact (Interviews 14, 19 and 26).

In general, the focus on prevention has been *partial low* in relation to the Western Balkans where EULEX and the design of the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue have at numerous times been seen as kindling the embers of ethnic tension rather than cooling them (Interviews 4 and 37). This could in part be alleviated through stronger local partnerships and engagements and a better utilisation of local information from CSDP staff through delegations (Sections 3.7 and 3.8). In the Horn of Africa, the strategic assessment and response in shaping CSDP missions is seen as an indicator for a *partial high* focus on prevention.

#### 3.4. MOBILISING DIFFERENT STRENGTHS

For mobilising different strengths, the CA focuses on both member states and EU capabilities. In the assessment of the implementation on the operational level, the report analyses three indicators; (a) whether EU Delegations effectively create coherence between EU and member states' activities, (b) whether the delegations contribute to conflict risk analysis, and (c) whether joint field missions (EEAS, commission, member states) have been conducted.

In the Western Balkans, EU Special Representative (EUSRs) have been appointed in both BiH and Kosovo, with a mandate to coordinate EU action on the ground. Both EUSRs are double-hatted as head of the EU Delegation (Sarajevo)/EU Office (Pristina), but they also have their own teams who function separately from those of the Delegation/Office. In both capitals, the EUSR and the EU Delegation/EU Office organise meetings attended by member states'

missions, EULEX (in Kosovo), EUFOR (in BiH) and, depending on the subject, partner countries and international organisations. These gatherings include Head of Missions (HoM) meetings and meetings on specific sectors (economy and trade, rule of law, public administration reform, etc.). In BiH, however, political advisors no longer meet on a regular basis (Interview 28), and the EU's presence and member states seem to rely significantly on less formal coordination meetings in specific fields, such as "human rights and gender coffees" (Interview 13). It appears that the dominant purpose of these meetings is to exchange information about current activities rather than to pursue wider capability utilisation and coherence through joint analysis and planning (Interview 13).

In BiH, member states' embassies are not included in programming of the Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA), but are "informed about the process" and have an opportunity to provide comments (Interview 11). Furthermore, in recognition of the absence of a comprehensive internal coordination mechanism for IPA, the Commission announced that the assistance would concentrate on sectors "where agreed strategies and sufficient sector coordination existed" (European Commission, 2017, p.2). And in Kosovo, since the Ministry of European Integration took over coordination of IPA programming, within-EU meetings on programming support take place on an irregular and *ad hoc* basis (Interview 9). In general, there is an impression that coordination is exhausted in information sharing (Interview 9). There is also a strong notion among internationals on the ground that it is up to Kosovar authorities to coordinate donor assistance in order to avoid overlapping (Interviews 11 and 29). This reflects a difficult trade-off between local ownership and effective coordination that warrants further analysis by the EU staff in the field.

When it comes to sharing analyses on ongoing developments with member states, the evidence is ambiguous. For instance, in Sarajevo smaller member states' embassies appreciate weekly political updates shared by the EUSR, as they lack the capacity to conduct effective monitoring themselves (Interview 28). In addition, embassies can request in-house analysis by the EUSR or translations of laws. Nevertheless, there is a complaint that the many EUSR advisors exclusively share important information with 'big players' and ignore enquiries from smaller member state embassies (Interview 28). When it comes to assessing security developments, the practice seems to be "every office for itself". Member states' missions regularly and proactively reach out to EULEX, KFOR and the OSCE or they hire external consultants for conflict analysis rather than have the EU Delegation act as the focal point to avoid duplication of effort (Interview 29, 47 and 48). Regarding joint field missions, the strategic reviews of CSDP missions in the Western Balkans have involved DG NEAR and DG HOME and entailed meetings with member states' embassies in the field (Interview 49). Moreover, EUSR regularly facilitates exchanges between representatives of the EU institutions in Brussels making field visits to Pristina and representatives of the member states' missions (Interview 29).



In the Horn of Africa, the EU Delegation for Somalia has managed to organise effective information sharing and coordination among actors located in Nairobi (Interviews 23 and 24), but less so within Mogadishu. Coordination meetings regularly happen between heads of mission and the EU Delegation as well as some member states, but rarely resulting in adaptation of actions as the output, or with forward-looking planning and joint programming as part of the agenda (Interviews 14 and 26). There is no capacity for conflict risk analysis within the Delegation, and the sharing of intelligence and forward-looking operational updates between CSDP missions and the Delegation is close to non-existent (Interviews 14 and 17). In the interfaces between EUNAVFOR and EUCAP, there is significant cooperation and exchange of staff and resources, and respondents generally describe these missions' interface with the EU Delegation as more amicable than that of EUTM (Interviews 14, 19 and 33). It is, however, noted that the EU Delegation in Somalia has "chosen" to involve itself less in the coordination and support between CSDP instruments and member states than Delegations in other conflict and crisis environments, such as Mali (Interviews 19 and 20). A similar example is given in relation to the staffing of the EU Delegation, which regularly hires consultants to conduct short-term tasks for which the necessary expertise already exists within the CSDP missions and operations (Interviews 19 and 20). The use of consultants may on the one hand be seen as an indicator of flexible and dynamic staffing (see also section 3.7), but on further scrutiny is found to reflect staffing difficulties in securing relevant experts on e.g. migration and counterterrorism, as these individuals are in high demand by member states and very difficult to get on secondments (Interview 12). This in turns leads to more of these specialists being found in CSDP missions and operation with shorter postings, but then not being utilised by the Delegations. As in the Western Balkans, joint field missions have been common, although their outcome in terms of joint planning has been questionable and CSDP missions and operations have rarely been included (Interviews 14, 24 and 26), leaving both cases with an assessment of *partial high* on indicator 4.c.

In both case areas, we find that EU Delegations work actively to create coherence between member states, CSDP instruments and the office of the EUSR, leaving this indicator as *partial high*. However, although the CA articulates the specific need for EU Delegations to contribute to ongoing conflict risk analysis to inform operational choices and priorities, this has not yet materialised in the staffing of EU Delegations (Interviews 12, 21 and 34), leading to *no* on indicator 4.b. As a result, each mission and operation is instead left to conduct its own operational-level analysis as best it can within its capabilities. The lack of shared operational-level analysis also leads to increased difficulties in mobilising different strengths in support of CSDP instruments. As such, the short-term use of any EU military asset (e.g. armoured vehicles) in support of another CSDP or EU action requires approval at the strategic level in Brussels, rather than local reprioritisation between missions, and there is no incentive to provide support outside the specific mission mandate (Interviews 15, 16, 33 and 46; see also Zartsdahl, 2018). Once the operational level develops qualified and shared analytical capacity, delegation of decision-making would be a recommendable step.

### 3.5. LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

On long-term commitment the following indicators were explored: (a) whether there is a coordination system in place for long-term and short-term objectives and actors; (b) whether there is pooling and sharing of European capacities and coordination and combining EU tools and instruments; and (c) whether there is effective use of lessons learned. The pooling and sharing of European capacities across civilian and military interfaces (indicator 5.b) is analysed in some depth as part of the EU-CIVCAP DL 5.3 (Zartsdahl & Đokić, 2018)<sup>10</sup> and is thus allotted less scrutiny in this analysis.

In the Western Balkans, the EU has utilised a range of tools and instruments. The most complex case demonstrating how the EU has combined its different capacities is the process of normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. While the HRVP facilitates the Brussels dialogue at the highest political level, the EU Office administers IPA funding for implementation of the agreements and the EULEX provides operational and technical support (Interviews 5 and 50). This practice, however, has revealed shortcomings: the flow of information from Brussels to the EUSR and the EU Office on the dialogue is severely limited (Interview 37), and although the EULEX serves in an advisory role to the EEAS within its technical support, such advice is not always heeded or asked for (Interview 51).

Coordination among different EU capabilities shows weaknesses in other areas as well. The EU Office, EUSR team and the EULEX cooperate in legislative review, i.e. drafting amendments to legislative proposals, but the EU Office does not utilise all the EULEX-based expertise in the rule of law. External consultants tend to be hired in cases when the EULEX has experts in the same matter “whose assessment would be more comprehensive than one of an expert who has come for a couple of days” (Interview 51). The use of external experts is facilitated through TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument), which requires them to come from member states’ public institutions (universities, public administration). Objections to such practice have been frequently raised in the Western Balkans, as this requirement prevents the use of in-house expertise of EUSR and Delegations, local expertise (which is often developed with support from EU funding) or even knowledge from non-governmental actors based in the EU (Interview 13). Overall, this puts indicator 5.a as *partial/low*. Pooling and sharing is only found to be established through joint project funding and implementation. The EU Office may select national development agencies as implementing partners for their projects or arrange joint, co-funded projects with member states (Interviews 9 and 29). It appears that such cooperation is mostly launched through bilateral

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<sup>10</sup> The report finds that within overlapping or closely related mandates, cooperation and coordination often lead to successful synergies and exchange of capabilities. It therefore offers several recommendations aimed at increasing coherence in what is still the most challenging organisational interface; the civil-military.



communication and is not preceded by systematic joint programming. Therefore, indicator 5.b is also assessed as *partial low*.

The Western Balkans have in many aspects served as a testing ground for coordinating short-term and long-term objectives. The EULEX mission lacked contacts with the EUSR in Pristina when it was first launched (Interview 33) and, according to an international official, the lessons learned in this region prompted the EEAS to establish cooperation with DG NEAR “from the outset” while planning the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine (Interview 49). Nevertheless, interviews in Kosovo suggest that the systematic flaws in the EULEX mission noted in a report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA, 2012) have never been effectively addressed (Interviews 51 and 52). It is uncertain if the process of collecting lessons learnt is capable of capturing all the pertinent issues arising in the field. According to a former EUSR staff member in Sarajevo, reporting on challenges “goes through too many filters, so it becomes difficult even to identify challenges” (Interview 53). One important filter takes the form of career concerns: “If I tried to alert someone about the decisions I found problematic, I think I would have been fired” (Interview 53). This may explain an observation by an EEAS official that most lessons learnt in the process are “non-sensitive” (Interview 54). Overall, the effectiveness of the use of lessons learned (indicator 5.c) is assessed as *no* within the case, despite its application in setting up later CSDP missions.

In the Horn of Africa, the EU is generally lauded for having consistently supported the establishment of the Somali Transitional Federal Government since the initial Somali reconciliation conference in 2004 (Interview 40). In the long-term perspective of state-building, it may thus be considered a pro-active actor initiating relevant efforts to prevent resurgent violence or state collapse. At the operational level, however, EU instruments are perceived as excessively bureaucratic and heavily reactive, leading to extended response times for urgent matters (Interviews 32, 43 and 45). CSDP staff regularly point to this contradiction, referring to slow response cycles and short-term mandates to carry out long-term peacebuilding (Interviews 14, 17, 19 and 26). There is, however, significant and strong cooperation by EUCAP Somalia and EUNAVFOR to anchor positive developments with external partners with longer-term perspectives. This effort is exemplified in the continuous cooperation and coordination with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). These clear cases of anchoring short-term objectives with long-term perspective partners inform an assessment of indicator 5.a as *partial high*. It should be noted, however, that no similar connections have been established by the EUTM or indeed by the EU Delegation on behalf of the EU CSDP engagements.

Successful cases of pooling and sharing include the cooperation between EUNAVFOR and EUCAP where EUCAP staff has boarded EUNAVFOR vessels for wider geographic access and increased situational awareness of the maritime environment. There are, however, significant obstacles for resources and information to be shared among instruments that may not have

a direct mandate link. In the operational guidance provided, there is little or no incentive to coordinate or pool capabilities outside individual instruments. This observation also applies to exchanges between CSDP instruments as well as wider EU instruments and member states. In general, the stove-pipe system of command and Brussels-centralised decision-making process are often blamed by respondents (Interviews 14, 16 and 46). In a wider context, however, most EU policy and mandates fail to specify priorities in coordination, and as actors are continually resource-strapped, there is little if no structural incentive to assign assets to actors not working towards the same immediate mandate (Interviews 14 and 26). This is an understandable dynamic in narrow and short-term perspectives, but one that hampers the overall ability of instruments to prioritise in an operational context in line with overarching and strategic EU objectives. When it comes to EU staff and specialist capabilities already present on the ground, respondents found that the EU Delegation has regularly hired consultants when it could have made use of mission specialists (Interviews 19 and 20). Indicator 5.b is therefore assessed as *partial low*, again carried mainly by EUCAP and EUNAVFOR collaboration.

Similar to the concerns regarding pooling and sharing of resources, respondents have voiced concern that CSDP instruments do not share lessons learned (Interviews 14 and 17). This observation may be credible at the operational level, but in a regional perspective there are several examples of CSDP instruments adapting – albeit slowly – to lessons learned, strategic reviews and a changing environment (Interviews 25 and 54). Key examples have been the realignment and renaming of EUCAP Somalia in 2015 with a changed mandate to solely support the Somali government as opposed to a wider regional mandate. The decision to realign and relocate the mission headquarters to Mogadishu was based on a strategic review taking account of the results and lessons learned in the first two years of the mission's deployment as EUCAP Nestor. A second example has been the continuous adaptation, relocation and mandate updates for EUTM Somalia, which has changed its focus since its initial deployment in Uganda from training of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), junior officers, and specialists to providing strategic advice and training of high-level officers and staff in the Somali National Army (SNA) and Ministry of Defence (MoD), and relocating activities to Mogadishu following the steady stabilisation and security provision delivered by AMISOM. Both examples highlight a flexible response in the interlinkages between the strategic and operational levels. While information sharing, including lessons learned, may be less than optimal at the operational level, the response and exchange through mandating between the operational and strategic level warrants a *partial high* assessment of the effective use of lessons learned, with room for improvement particularly in interfaces on the ground.

### 3.6. LINKING POLICIES AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACTION

The CA acknowledges that EU internal policies can have significant external impact on conflict and crisis situations (European Commission, 2013, p.9). For the operational level and for CSDP in particular, a single indicator (6.a) explores whether there is perceived coherence between EU internal policies and external action and objectives.

Due to its proximity to the EU, the EU's internal and external policies have long been interlinked in the Western Balkans (see Collantes-Celador & Juncos, 2012). As previously mentioned, the EU's enlargement policy is regarded as a driver of stabilisation, but at the same time it is deemed to be "an investment in the EU's security, economic growth and influence and in its ability to protect its citizens" (European Commission, 2018). The 'EU migration crisis' of 2015 drew political attention and earmarked funding to the Balkans as one of the key routes (Lilyanova, 2016). The 2018 Commission Communication sets out six flagship initiatives for the region: rule of law, security and migration, socio-economic development, transport and energy connectivity, digital agenda, and reconciliation and good neighbourly relations (European Commission, 2018). The BiH Reform Agenda, a government document whose drafting was supported by the EU, vows to continue developing regional and international police cooperation, to conclude an operational agreement with EUROPOL and to adopt a national counter-terrorism strategy (Reform Agenda, 2015). Among the key concerns for internal-external consistency for the Western Balkans, therefore, has been the clashing paradigms of using EU enlargement and integration prospects as drivers for peacebuilding, while at the same time recognising the internal 'enlargement fatigue' of many member states. This has led to contradictory statements and very long accession processes that risk negatively affecting the peacebuilding process in the longer term (see Juncos, 2012). This puts the overall assessment for Western Balkans as *partial high*.

For the Horn of Africa, most internal-external interfaces relate to migration policies and the maritime transport policy in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. At the field level interfaces with EU maritime policies have been established through multi-actor working groups with private and business enterprises interfacing for instance with EUCAP on matters of maritime policing capabilities off the coast of Somalia (Interview 14). In general, respondents have found only very limited contradictions between internal policies and external actions, and most of the challenges cited relate to very specific issues, such as funding mechanisms or more direct restrictions on external actions, e.g. requests to equip the Somalia National Armed Forces as an integrated part of building military capacity (Interviews 14 and 26). This puts the indicator at *partial high*.

### 3.7. MAKING BETTER USE OF EU DELEGATIONS

The specified actions for making better use of the EU Delegations overlap with many of the policy objectives above but are assessed here along three independent indicators: (a) whether there is joint reporting with the member states; (b) whether there is breadth of expertise and a dynamic and context-adaptive structure in the EU Delegations; and (c) whether other EU actors have co-located with the Delegations.

The EU Office (EUO) in Kosovo is a part of the network of the EU Delegations and is as such under the responsibility of the High Representative. The EUO invites member states' missions to provide inputs for the European Commission's country reports on Kosovo, though there is no standard procedure or template for that (Interview 9). The EUSR, Head of the EULEX and Heads of the member states' missions frequently resort to joint outreach efforts by issuing statements together. In BiH, the EU Delegation used to organise joint field visits to municipalities outside Sarajevo (for instance, after the flooding in 2014) and it still facilitates organising visits for individual ambassadors to particular municipalities (Interview 8).

Both in Sarajevo and in Pristina, EUSR teams are co-located with the Delegation/EUO. EUFOR is co-located with NATO HQ Sarajevo. The EULEX mission HQ is not co-located with the EUO/EUSR, but regular contact is maintained (Interview 5). However, the above described instances in which the EU Office outsources consultancy tasks when the EULEX could offer its experts suggest that there is room for more efficient use of EU resources on the ground. Efficiency is important considering that both EULEX and the EUO are facing staffing constraints (Interview 10; ECA 2012). On the other hand, the EU Delegation and the EUSR team in Sarajevo employ more staff than most other delegations, allowing for higher levels of specialisation in terms of portfolios (Interview 13). At the same time, even though EUSR team members have portfolio counterparts in the Delegation, it seems that they are not significantly involved in programming financial assistance, and the level of involvement tends to depend on the individual staff member (Interview 13). Mainstreaming horizontal issues such as gender equality in sector-specific portfolios also appears to be a challenge (Interview 11). Furthermore, there is a feeling that the expertise of local staff garnered over long careers with EUSR "could be consulted more" (Interview 13).

Apart from staffing challenges, the EUO and EUSR in Kosovo face a political one: insufficient information sharing from the EEAS about the Brussels Dialogue. While the EUSR and her team occasionally engage in responding to local tensions such as those surrounding the wall in Northern Mitrovica (Interview 5), she is absent from the high-level dialogue process, even though she has a major role in supporting implementation of agreements in the field (Interview 37).

In the Horn of Africa, joint reporting between CSDP instruments, member states and the EU Delegation was not identified, and several EU staff members expressed bewilderment as to

why stronger joint reporting and exchange of resources had not been established (Interviews 14, 15, 16 and 46). The same challenges were found in regard to EU Delegation staffing and breadth of expertise where consultants were reported to be regularly contracted to deliver work and expertise that were already available within CSDP missions and operations (Interviews 19 and 20). The puzzle on the non-exchange of resources and expertise was further confounded by the fact that forward elements of EUCAP (specifically the Deputy Head of Mission) has been co-located with the EU Delegation inside Mogadishu International Airport. It was found, however, that the additional EUCAP staff members co-located with the Delegation had been placed there not to pursue coherence, but rather due to a simple logistical lack of accommodation in the International Campus with the rest of the mission staff. Apart from the Deputy Head of Mission, the staff members accommodated with the EU Delegation saw no benefit and were instead frustrated by the additional security and logistical restrictions that they had to operate under, due to the difficulties in transport between the two accommodation areas (Interviews 15 and 46).

This puts joint reporting (indicator 7.a) as *partial low* for the Western Balkans and as *no* for the Horn of Africa. Looking at the EU Delegation's breadth of expertise (indicator 7.b), both case areas are assessed as *partial low*, and for co-location (indicator 7.c), the Western Balkans is found to be *partial high*, while the Horn of Africa is *partial low*. This does, however, put both case areas at a combined assessment of *partial low* for improving EU Delegations. As mentioned in the previous sections, the general shortcomings in coordination leadership and the general role of EU Delegations as a focal point for conflict risk analysis and joint reporting influence many other areas of the comprehensive approach. Therefore, improvement of EU Delegations should be considered a primary objective, which has not been sufficiently actioned in either of the case areas.

### 3.8. WORKING IN PARTNERSHIPS

The CA calls for the EU to engage and work in partnerships with other international and regional actors. This objective is assessed along two indicators: (a) whether CSDP missions and operations are developed in a way that takes into account the role of other actors; and (b) whether the EU missions and delegations are engaging closely with major INGOs, civil society, think tanks and academia (See Dijkstra et al., 2017; Algar-Faria et al., 2018).

BiH and Kosovo host a plethora of international personnel involved in peacebuilding and development. In BiH, the EU's political cooperation with other international actors is formalised to a certain extent: the European Commission, along with some member states, the US, Japan and Russia, sits on the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which provides the High Representative with political guidelines. The EUSR mandate calls for maintaining "close contacts and close consultations with the High Representative"

and the EUSR office was co-located with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) until 2011 (when it moved in with the EU Delegation). The Reform Agenda 2015-2020 was the result of the EU's cooperation with international financial institutions (IFIs).

Still, international actors have different political stances and enjoy disparate reputations among different ethnic groups. In Kosovo, UNMIK is highly unpopular among ethnic Albanian citizens. Moreover, part of the international community in Pristina views them as "a platform for Serb and Russian influence in Kosovo" (Interview 48). Conversely, the EULEX is not beloved in the North (Interview 55). The stance towards Kosovo's independence also influences cooperation among international actors and there is a natural tendency to work with like-minded partners (Interview 47).

The EU in Kosovo works closely with the US. The local stakeholders' perception is that, with the US around, "the EU is not always in the driver's seat" (Interview 56). According to a foreign diplomat, even when the EU requires the Kosovo government to align legislation with an EU standard, "the government goes to the Americans first to check if that is ok" (Interview 5). Coordination is found to be particularly challenging in drafting legislation, illustrated by a well-known story of the law on courts, no less than 50 drafts (!) of which circulated between the EU Office and the US Office before it was passed in Kosovo Assembly (ECA, 2012, p. 30; Interview 27). These different approaches are notable in other areas too. For instance, while the EU actively supports renewable energy, the US has pushed for an investment in a new coal power plant near Pristina (Interview 56; Mathiesen, 2016). Signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the US after years of engagement side by side in Kosovo is deemed to be an example of the lessons learned for the EUO (Interview 50). The US influence in Kosovo has also been applied in line with EU policies: for instance, the US has supported the EU's requirement for the border demarcation as a condition for visa liberalisation (Popova, 2016).

Political differences between international organisations are believed to hinder substantial coordination on the ground: "In each topic there is some kind of coordination mechanism, but you're talking about some coordinated approach; there is none." (Interview 57) Moreover, the EU is regarded by some as "really territorial" and prone to see other internationals in BiH as a competition in policies which it sees as "own turf" (Interview 58). In Kosovo, when the EULEX mission was deployed, its staff was perceived by UNMIK as ignorant and disparaging towards the UNMIK's previous track record rather than willing to learn (Interview 59). Transfer of knowledge was mainly implemented at a personal level, through the former UNMIK staff members who went on to work for the EU (Interview 59). In spite of having made some mediation efforts between Serbian and Kosovar politicians in the early 2000s, UNMIK was not consulted by the EU when the Brussels Dialogue was about to commence (Interview 59). Overall, indicator 8.a in the Western Balkans is therefore assessed as *partial low*.

The EU formally assigns a considerable value to relations with civil society in the Western Balkans, but there is divergent evidence of the impact that civil society actors can achieve in



cooperation with the EU's presence. Helping to establish and strengthen civil society is praised as the EU's greatest contribution in Kosovo (Interviews 4 and 60). Thanks to international support, including support by the EU, there is a number of NGOs in Kosovo "which are not irrelevant [and can] create a fuss" (Interview 4). The EUO is said to have a "good approach" to civil society and business representatives and regularly invites them to submit their input for semi-annual country reports issued by the European Commission (Interview 56). It also occasionally facilitates dialogue between civil society and the government, which enables integration of civil society proposals into national strategic documents (Interview 60). Furthermore, scholarship schemes through the Erasmus+ programme are singled out as beneficial for Kosovo in the long term, because young civil servants who pursued their education in EU countries "do things differently" (Interview 60).

At the same time, there are shortcomings in the EU's approach, which seem to be common for many international donors. Radical changes in funding priorities prevent continuation of initiatives that have shown good results or are necessary in their local communities (Interviews 61 and 62; See Christie et al., 2018). For instance, there used to be a strong focus on gender projects, but this topic has slipped from the international donors' agenda even though gender equality and gender-based violence remain a challenge (Interview 62). In BiH, the EU funds for civil society are said to be diminishing and organisations "have to possess considerable capacities just to submit a project application worth considering" (Interview 63). The existing expertise of civil society organisations is insufficiently used, according to both local and international personnel (Interviews 13, 64). The EUSR team/Delegation hold regular meetings with representatives of civil society, yet there is an impression that such meetings could be better utilised to understand the local context and not just figure as a "box-ticking exercise" (Interview 13). On behalf of civil society, there is also a complaint that the EU does not closely monitor their activities even if it financially supports them. One interlocutor observed that "EU officials often attend public events where there are BiH politicians, but rarely [civil society or academic] project launch events... To me, this sends a more important message than what the EU declares." (Interview 64). Therefore, indicator 8.b is assessed as *partial low*.

In the Horn of Africa, partnerships and involvement of other international actors have generally been very supportive of the activities of EUNAVFOR and EUCAP (Interviews 1, 14, 19, 22, 43 and 65), which is also evidenced by the adjustment in its mandate (see section 3.3) and close cooperation with the UN and other external partners (Zartsdahl & Đokić, 2018). Comments were received from respondents on the Somali government's side, however, that efforts at military capacity building (EUTM) duplicate those of numerous other partners (including the UAE, UK, US and Turkey), and that EU capabilities on this matter would be better utilised on high-level advice<sup>11</sup> and on assistance in coordinating the multi-actor

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<sup>11</sup> Something already on the drawing board (Interview 26)

capacity building, which at the moment far exceeds the capacity of the Somali MoD (Interviews 30, 31 and 32). In general, however, “taking into account the role of other international actors” is assessed as *partial high*.

With respect to forming partnerships with INGOs, civil society and similar actors (indicator 8.b), current data indicates a lack of engagement at the operational level as encouraged by the CA (European Commission, 2013, p.12). The research included the main academic actors in Somalia (including Somaliland) and accredited think tanks with regional and local expertise. In most of the cases, there had been no direct link or contact established with any EU instruments in the region (Interviews 39, 40, 66 and 67). In two cases (Interviews 41 and 42) involving a local stakeholder and a regional specialist, both had engaged with the EU, but considered the relationship to be very one-directional: “I have engaged with different projects and planning [...]. The EU has not been pro-active but rather passive” (Interview 41). From the EU side, no respondents were able to recall working with civil-society or local experts, mainly from the assumption that “that kind of resources were not available here” (Interview 14). This leads to an assessment of local partnerships (indicator 8.b) as *no* for interactions with Somali regional and local specialists.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Drawing on extensive empirical evidence, this study has shown that the comprehensive approach has been implemented to a higher degree in the Horn of Africa than in the Western Balkans, when it comes to sharing analysis [1], strategic vision [2] and a focus on prevention [3] and to a lesser degree when focusing on long-term commitment [5] and planning for transitions. This confirms the case selection criteria, but also highlights that the CA is far way from being implemented across the board. Our findings suggest that there are several persistent challenges articulated, but not yet mitigated through the CA, mainly due to a lack of effort in implementing its prescribed remedies. This leads to one key finding: that assumptions regarding whether the CA has failed or not (EEAS, 2018) are based on the lack of implementation rather than any faults in its prescribed actions. This poses a challenge for the upcoming integrated approach: if it is not the type of actions specified, but rather a lack of action that has proven a challenge for the CA, new wording is not likely to fare much better.



EU goals for the Comprehensive Approach (2013)	Western Balkans	Horn of Africa
1. Is there a shared analysis, and is it being used?	Partial low	Partial high
2. Is there a common strategic vision for the region?	Partial low	Partial high
3. Has there been a focus on prevention?	Partial low	Partial high
4. Were different strengths mobilized?	Partial high	Partial high
5. Is there a focus on long-term commitment?	Partial low	Partial high
6. Is there coherence between policies and internal and external actions?	Partial high	Partial high
7. Are the EU delegations utilised to the expected intent?	Partial low	Partial low
8. Are EU external actions conducted in partnership with international organisations and regional actors?	Partial low	Partial low

*Table 2: Summarized goal attainment matrix. For detailed indicators, see Annex 2.*

Future CSDP operations should seek to duplicate best practices from the Horn of Africa context in regions with less uniform member state interests. However, the alignment of diverse member states' interests will continue to pose a persistent challenge. The CA recommends, however, as do our research results, that future PFCAs should include independent positions by member states to delineate more clearly the internal political environment of the EU and to allow operational-level actors to make better-informed decisions when navigating the interfaces between mandates and regional priorities.

In addition to these challenges at the politico-strategic level, there are a number of persistent challenges to effective operational-level coordination. Firstly, key among them are (1) a lack of incentive for coordination across mission mandates and (2) the continuous stove-piping of missions and delegations due, *inter alia*, to separate funding mechanisms and member state opt-ins and -outs. Coordination and pursuit of coherence should be mandated for each operation, but also prioritised, taking into consideration the context in which an instrument is operating. With no mandated incentive for coordination, there is a clear tendency towards stove-piping and duplication of effort among EU external instruments.

Secondly, a prerequisite for the exchange of capabilities and the pursuit of coherence is the delegation of decision-making authority to the operational level. EU missions and operations carry infamously long chains of command with severely restricted commanders on the ground. In complex and non-permissive environments, EU military operations exercise

considerable freedom of movement, and if staffed to that end, they possess the capability for effective operational and tactical conflict analysis and intelligence management. Both are of potential value to EU Delegations as well the more sparsely staffed civilian CSDP missions, which in turn hold in-depth expertise on subjects of relevance to other EU instruments and the Delegations. It would be of great benefit if these capabilities could more flexibly support partners and other instruments in dynamic and threatening environments. However, this requires the delegation of decision-making authority to the operational, if not tactical level, to interpret mandates within regional frameworks and joint EU actions. As a basis for this delegation of decision-making capabilities, the study indicates that one clear premise and current shortcoming in EU external action is the distinct lack of: (1) operational and tactical-level conflict analysis and intelligence management, and (2) in the cases where operational analysis is conducted, a functional system for sharing it between EU instruments. Information management is an area with particular need for investment by the EEAS both in terms of staff and resources.

### Key policy recommendations

**1. A strategy of coherence requires leadership and ownership.** The implementation of the comprehensive approach lacked clear leadership and ownership, and the new and wider integrated approach is not likely to succeed unless these shortcomings are addressed. Ownership has recently and partly been established at the strategic level through the creation of the EEAS Division PRISM (Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation), but without endowing it with real decision-making capabilities, and a similar mediating entity at the operational level is still missing. Leadership and ownership could be increased through several of the more detailed recommendations below, but all of those require resourcing and incentives that have not yet been provided in sufficient quantity. Operational coordination is a constant practical struggle that must be continually resourced. Continuing to ask parties to pursue a 'spirit of harmonisation', rather than directly tasking and incentivizing is not likely to increase coherence in EU external action by any reasonable measure.

**2. The comprehensive approach should be implemented in full.** Before announcing the demise of the comprehensive approach, the EEAS must introspectively examine why its actions were never carried out and focus on implementation before subsuming its neglected policy measures into a wider and less-lucid framework of integration. In particular, the EU should focus its attention on measures that have not yet been successfully implemented, such as the development of shared conflict risk analysis, joint reporting, better use of EU Delegations and working in local partnerships.

**3. Best practices from the Horn of Africa should be duplicated in other contexts.** The Horn of Africa holds some good practices that warrant duplication elsewhere. Key among them are the establishment of a common strategic vision between member states, the EU Delegation and CSDP missions, as well as the long(er)-term commitment and focus on prevention created through coordination with the UN and larger EU member states. The exchange of staff and support between EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia are also examples to follow in terms of civil-military synergies and cooperation across the institutional divide.

**4. The EU should integrate leadership structures on the operational level and delegate decision-making.** There are few if any direct incentives for CSDP missions and operations to co-ordinate with horizontal partners and most activities of coordination focus solely on sharing of information and remain vulnerable to personal interpretations by mission leadership. As long as EU instruments are not integrated in some way or form at the operational level, managing incentives and coordination between them will continue to be severely challenged. When acting in conflict and crisis environments, coherence in action must be coordinated and led from the field. This requires a revision of the resourcing and staffing of EU Delegations as envisaged in the comprehensive approach and a more flexible exchange of resources and support between the EU Delegation and CSDP missions and instruments. This would most effectively be achieved by integrating chains of command.

**5. The EU must at a minimum provide resources for operational and tactical level-conflict analysis and simple system(s) for sharing sensitive and operational information between its instruments.** A sub-element to the integration of operational-level leadership is the persistent challenge caused by a lack of shared conflict analysis and systems for sharing sensitive and operational information. In the absence of a common operational picture available to all EU staff, coherence will remain severely challenged. The information shared should include common EU positions and explanations of positions where member states diverge, so that all EU staff are able to act and be perceived to represent a unified bloc by local partners, particularly host nation governments.

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## ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

No.	Affiliation	Type of organisation	Date	Location
1	European Union	International organisation	15/01/2018	Brussels
2	European Union	International organisation	17/01/2018	Brussels
3	European Union	International organisation	17/01/2018	Brussels
4	Local media	Non-governmental	27/03/2017	Pristina
5	European Union	International organisation	30/03/2017	Pristina
6	European Union	International organisation	09/11/2017	Brussels
7	Government	Governmental	27/03/2017	Pristina
8	MS embassy	Governmental	02/02/2018	Sarajevo
9	MS embassy	Governmental	28/07/2017	Skype
10	International organisation	Governmental	12/07/2017	Pristina
11	Government	International organisation	13/03/2018	Sarajevo
12	European Union	International organisation	15/01/2018	Brussels
13	Government	International organisation	28/02/2018	Sarajevo
14	European Union	International organisation	27/09/2017	Mogadishu
15	European Union	International organisation	07/03/2018	Mogadishu
16	European Union	International organisation	17/03/2018	Skype
17	European Union	International organisation	27/09/2017	Mogadishu
18	Regional specialist	Private	25/09/2017	Mogadishu
19	European Union	International organisation	17/01/2018	Brussels
20	European Union	International organisation	17/01/2018	Brussels
21	European Union	International organisation	18/01/2018	Brussels
22	Member state	Governmental	07/03/2018	Mogadishu
23	MS embassy	Governmental	25/01/2018	Skype
24	MS embassy	Governmental	06/12/2017	Nairobi
25	European Union	International organisation	17/01/2018	Brussels
26	European Union	International organisation	06/03/2018	Mogadishu
27	Local NGO	Non-governmental	28/03/2017	Pristina
28	MS embassy	Governmental	13/03/2018	Sarajevo
29	MS embassy	Governmental	11/07/2017	Pristina
30	Ministry	Governmental	26/09/2017	Mogadishu
31	Ministry	Governmental	25/09/2017	Mogadishu
32	Ministry	Governmental	26/09/2017	Mogadishu
33	European Union	International organisation	22/02/2018	Brussels
34	European Union	International organisation	15/01/2018	Brussels
35	Local media	Non-governmental	21/04/2017	Mitrovica
36	Local NGO	Non-governmental	03/02/2017	Mitrovica
37	European Union	International organisation	29/03/2017	Pristina
38	Local NGO	Non-governmental	21/04/2018	Mitrovica
39	Regional academic institution	Private university	31/08/2017	Hargeisa
40	Regional specialist	Private	18/09/2017	Mogadishu
41	Regional specialist	Private	18/09/2017	Mogadishu
42	Local stakeholder	Private	18/09/2017	Mogadishu
43	United Nations	International organisation	27/09/2017	Mogadishu
44	African Union	International organisation	28/06/2017	Nairobi

No.	Affiliation	Type of organisation	Date	Location
45	United Nations	International organisation	26/09/2017	Mogadishu
46	European Union	International organisation	07/03/2018	Mogadishu
47	MS embassy	Governmental	12/07/2017	Pristina
48	International organisation	International organisation	21/04/2017	Pristina
49	European Union	International organisation	22/02/2018	Brussels
50	International organisation	International organisation	02/02/2017	Pristina
51	International organisation	International organisation	12/07/2017	Pristina
52	Government	Governmental	27/03/2017	Pristina
53	European Union	International organisation	28/02/2018	Sarajevo
54	European Union	International organisation	15/01/2018	Brussels
55	Development agency	Governmental	14/07/2017	Pristina
56	Local NGO	Non-governmental	11/07/2017	Pristina
57	International organisation	International organisation	27/02/2018	Sarajevo
58	International organisation	International organisation	26/02/2018	Sarajevo
59	International organisation	International organisation	29/03/2017	Pristina
60	Local NGO	Non-governmental	13/07/2017	Pristina
61	Local NGO	Non-governmental	13/07/2017	Pristina
62	Local NGO	Non-governmental	01/09/2017	Belgrade
63	Local NGO	Non-governmental	28/02/2018	Sarajevo
64	Local NGO	Non-governmental	13/03/2018	Sarajevo
65	Ministry	Governmental	28/08/2017	Hargeisa
66	Regional think tank	Private	28/08/2017	Hargeisa
67	Regional academic institution	University	18/09/2017	Hargeisa



## ANNEX 2: GOAL ATTAINMENT MATRIX

EU goals for Comprehensive Approach (2013)	Western Balkans	Horn of Africa
<b>1. Is there a shared analysis, and is it being used?</b>	<b>Partial low</b>	<b>Partial high</b>
a. Is there coherence between PRISM, EU delegations, CSDP HQs and member state embassies in their understanding of (1) EU objectives and (2) regional conflict analysis?	Partial low	Partial high
b. Is there a shared document articulating (1) nature of the regional challenges/problem, (2) why EU should act based on interests, values, objectives and mandates), and (3) the available, and best suited, instruments to act with?	Partial low	Yes
<b>2. Is there a common strategic vision for the region?</b>	<b>Partial low</b>	<b>Partial high</b>
a. Does the strategy include both member states' and EU objectives and priorities for the region or country?	Partial low	Partial high
<b>3. Has there been a focus on prevention?</b>	<b>Partial low</b>	<b>Partial high</b>
a. To what degree could or should earlier action have been possible?	Partial low	Partial high
<b>4. Were different strengths mobilized?</b>	<b>Partial high</b>	<b>Partial high</b>
a. Are EU delegations effectively creating coherence between EU and member states' activities?	Partial high	Partial high
b. Does the delegation conduct or contribute to ongoing conflict risk analysis?	No	No
c. Have joint field missions (EEAS, commission, member states) been conducted?	Partial high	Partial high
<b>5. Is there a focus on long-term commitment?</b>	<b>Partial low</b>	<b>Partial high</b>
a. Is there a coordination system and plan for long-term and short-term objectives?	Partial low	Partial high
b. Are European capacities pooled and shared, and are tools and instruments combined and coordinated?	Partial high	No
c. Are lessons identified effectively learned?	No	Partial high
<b>6. Is there coherence between policies and internal and external actions?</b>	<b>Partial high</b>	<b>Partial high</b>
a. Is there coherence between external actions and objectives, and internal policies?	Partial high	Partial high
<b>7. Are the EU delegations utilized to the expected intent?</b>	<b>Partial low</b>	<b>Partial low</b>
a. Is there joint reporting with member states?	Partial low	No
b. Is there 'breadth' of expertise in EU delegations, and is their structure dynamic and context-adaptive?	Partial low	Partial low
c. Have other EU actors or institutions co-located with delegations?	Partial high	Partial low
<b>8. Are EU external actions conducted in partnership with international organisations and regional actors?</b>	<b>Partial low</b>	<b>Partial low</b>
a. Are missions developed in a way that takes into account the roles of other actors?	Partial low	Partial high
b. Are EU missions and delegations engaging closely with major INGOs, civil society, think-tanks and academia?	Partial low	No